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ARTICLES
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO INCOME TAX




Throughout the world, income taxation is one of the principal methods
by which nation-states raise revenue to fund ever-increasing governmen-
tal expenditure. While several different taxing regimes exist, it comes as
no surprise to tax professionals that these different tax systems share
many common principles and, indeed, a common language of income tax-
ation. For example, there are many similarities in the various approaches
taken to determine exactly what is to be included in the income tax base,
and most systems generally compute taxable income by allowing for re-
ductions or deductions for the cost of making profits, including al-
lowances for capital recovery.
Once one begins to focus on specifics, however, these broad similarities
may be obscured by the many differences in various income tax laws.
Certainly, because of disparities in the political, social, economic, and
moral objectives of societies, one would expect differences. These varia-
tions might be viewed as simply differences in detail-not substance, such
as differences in the time period by which capital may be recovered
through depreciation or otherwise. Such distinctions, on the other hand,
might be more appropriately characterized as fundamental doctrinal dif-
ferences regarding the proper approach to the formulation of the tax
base. These latter differences provide the focus for this analysis of the
British and the American tax structures.
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. The idea for this article arose
when I taught taxation as a visitor at the London School of Economics and Political Sci-
ence. I am deeply indebted to Judith Freedman of the London School of Economics and
Political Science and George K. Yin of the University of Virginia for their comments on
earlier drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
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The study herein is a comparative analysis. Though it commences with
a history and outline of the relevant law of the United Kingdom and the
United States, it is not limited to simply reporting particular solutions.'
True comparative law is "the study of the relationship of one legal system
and its rules with another."2 Such a process requires "specific compara-
tive reflections on the problem to which the work is devoted." 3
The comparative approach followed here seeks to investigate the na-
ture and development of tax law through an examination of the general
structure of two systems. By examining each system's approach to the
resolution of similar problems, this analysis reflects on the approach and
substance of each system. It is, however, axiomatic that such a study can
never be entirely systematic because the author must select the subject
and problems to study-a necessarily subjective process.4 Moreover, this
author freely admits that the subjects selected were chosen due to the
often dramatic way they expose the fundamental nature of the two sys-
tems. My objective, however, is to provide an analysis of the conse-
quences of the different approaches.
Alan Watson, a leading authority on comparative law, suggested that
comparisons are difficult and may not be particularly worthwhile except
when the legal systems are closely related.' One needs to examine the
general relationship, and one's task is easier if the rules of one system
were derived from or influenced by the other.6 The United States and
the United Kingdom share the same general system of law: that is, the
common law system of jurisprudence. These two countries offer a natural
comparison. But income tax presents a wrinkle in each country's system
of law because it is initially a legislative undertaking. Certainly, the colo-
nists did not import the British system of income taxation to America
since no such system existed in the United Kingdom until the Napoleonic
1. A study that simply reports particular solutions might be described as "descriptive
comparative law." See 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPAR-
ATIVE LAW 6 (Tony Weir, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1987). For an example of
descriptive comparative law in the tax area see COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS: EUROPE,
CANADA, AND JAPAN (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1987).
2. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 6
(1974).
3. 1 ZWEIGART & KOTZ, supra note 1, at 6.
4. See WATSON, supra note 2, at 11 ("To some variable and indefinable extent any
study of Comparative Law will be subjective, and no objective test will demonstrate that
the aspects considered were the most appropriate and the only ones appropriate.").
5. Id. at 7 ("[W]here there is no relationship there can be no Comparative Law, and
any comparison drawn between rules will be arbitrary and without systematic worth.").
6. See id.
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Wars.7 Nor, as we shall see, did the existing United Kingdom system
greatly influence initial tax legislation in the United States.' On the one
hand, common law systems have methods of finding and applying law
that are similar in character, and these methods influence judicial atti-
tudes toward statutes. 9 On the other hand, the British and American
statutory schemes could hardly have started farther apart structurally. 10
The study herein demonstrates, however, that the comparison of starkly
contrasting systems may actually yield the greatest insight into the nature
of legal doctrine.'1
An effective comparison and critique of the material elements of the
respective systems begins with a general definition of the income tax
base. Due to its broad approach,' 2 the accretion concept of income,
sometimes referred to as the Schanz-Haig-Simons approach, has been
chosen, 13 as set forth in the work of Henry Simons. 4
The case for using Simons's work is compelling. He presents a compre-
hensive, yet simple, definition of income that offers an actual procedure
for its measurement. He also provides a useful discussion of other tax
theories, which is an important element for comparison because different
7. See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of the in-
come tax system in the United Kingdom, beginning in 1799).
8. See infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text (providing a general overview of the
structural differences between the two systems).
9. See P.S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1985) (ex-
ploring the relationship between the common law and statute law). For example, courts in
both countries share a similar view of cases reversed by statutes. Atiyah's statement that
"[als a general rule, the courts tend to regard the statutory reversal of judicial decisions as
not affecting the underlying principles of those decisions" reflects this view. Id. at 12. An
excellent example of this phenomenon under American law is the often-cited case, Higgins
v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1940) (holding that a taxpayer may not deduct a loss resulting
from the sale of securities to a corporation that the taxpayer wholly owns). Section 267 of
the U.S. tax code now covers this decision. See I.R.C. § 267(a), (b)(2) (1994).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 61-81.
11. Indeed, Watson seems to recognize this possibility. In another article he states, "It
may well be that at some point in time, the biggest advances in understanding law achieved
through looking at various systems will occur by a non-historical investigation of unrelated
systems." Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313,320
(1978).
12. See John G. Head & Richard M. Bird, Tax Policy Options in the 1980s, in COMPAR-
ATIVE TAX STUDIEs 3, 9 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 1983) (discussing the broad application of
taxation on personal income as suggested by Henry Simons in 1938).
13. See generally ROBERT M. HAIG, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal
Aspects, reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (1959) (providing an
overview of this approach).
14. See generally HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938). Indeed, it
is commonplace in tax policy discussions in the United States to start with the work of
Henry Simons.
1996]
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theories have influenced nations' legislative, administrative, and judicial
determinations with regard to income tax.
To see this, we begin with a brief examination of several economic the-
ories of income. Simons refers to four distinct senses in which the term
income is employed: income from things, social or national income, gain
from transactions, and personal income.15 First, the most common sense
in which the term was employed prior to Simons's work characterized
income as arising from things, that is, "income may be conceived in terms
of services derived from things or, quantitatively, in terms of the market
value of uses."1 6 Thus, one speaks of income from land or other prop-
erty, or income derived from the provision of services.
Second, one can speak of social income, or the aggregate results of
economic activity during a period which "must equal the aggregate
money value of all goods produced and services rendered during the
year.' 1 7 Income for tax purposes, therefore, is each individual's share of
national income. The similarity in concept between "income from things"
and "social income" can readily be seen in comments Adam Smith pro-
vided in the Wealth of Nations:
The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country, com-
prehends the whole annual produce of their land and labour; the
neat [net] revenue, what remains free to them after deducting
the expense of maintaining; first, their fixed; and, secondly, their
circulating capital; or what, without encroaching upon their cap-
ital, they can place in their stock reserved for immediate con-
sumption, or spend upon their subsistence, conveniences, and
amusements. I s
The third sense, gain from transactions, deals with changes in the mar-
ket value of property realized upon sale or other disposition. 9 It deals
not only with capital gain but also with trading profits.2" This sense of
income is not a complete conceptual framework, but has been considered
an aspect of income.
The fourth sense of income, personal income, is Simons's own contri-
bution, though he acknowledged the important contribution of Haig:2
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the
15. See id. at 44-47.
16. Id. at 44.
17. Id. at 45 n.7 (quoting R.T. ELY, OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS 100, 105 (4th ed. 1923)).
18. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 286-87 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776).
19. See SIMONS, supra note 14, at 44.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 206.
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change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question. In other words, it
is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the
period to "wealth" at the end of the period and then subtracting
"wealth" at the beginning. The sine qua non of income is gain,
as our courts have recognized in their more lucid moments-
and gain to someone during a specified time interval. More-
over, this gain may be measured and defined most easily by pos-
iting a dual objective or purpose, consumption and
accumulation, each of which may be estimated in a common unit
by appeal to market prices.22
These definitions have had different impacts on the British and Ameri-
can tax systems. In general, Simons's definition has deeply influenced the
United States.23 To the contrary, the definitions based on income from
things or national income have left a strong imprint on the United King-
dom. 24 Though neither country has religiously conformed its system with
these different economic ideals, each system's roots in different traditions
can, and has, produced different results.
A warning may be appropriate. One can easily see that Simons's defi-
nition of income is the most comprehensive. It not only covers what is
included in the first three senses of income, it expands upon them.25 One
would naturally assume that the United States system, more heavily influ-
enced by Simons's concept, is much more comprehensive than that of the
United Kingdom. The United States, however, has moved steadily away
from comprehensive taxation and, indeed, has adopted some of the re-
strictive structural features of the British system; some have proposed
even further movement in this direction.26 On the other hand, the United
22. Id. at 50.
23. See generally infra text accompanying notes 38-60 (discussing the development of
U.S. income taxation).
24. See generally infra text accompanying notes 27-37 (discussing the historical begin-
nings of the income tax system in the United Kingdom).
25. See SIMONS, supra note 14, at 44-47.
26. In a 1992 recommendation to Congress, the U.S. Treasury Department stated its
long-term policy preference for a "schedular tax on enterprise activity." A Recommenda-
tion for Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA)
No. 240, at L-7 (Dec. 14, 1992). These recommendations, however, have not lead to any
dramatic changes in the taxation of business income to date. The recent tax reform propo-
sal by the Kemp Commission suggests excluding capital gains and income from savings
from the tax base. See The National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform,
Unleashing America's Potential: A Pro-growth, Pro-Family Tax System for the 21st Century,
in 70 TAX NOTES 413,424-25 (1996). The Kemp Commission's proposal requires the appli-
cation of the source-based, schedular principles of taxation found in the United Kingdom.
See infra text accompanying notes 66-70 (describing the relationship between the concept
of source and a schedular income tax system).
1996]
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Kingdom system has moved away from the limitations imposed by the
narrower definition. More surprisingly, however, the very structure de-
rived from the United Kingdom system's more limited starting point has
expanded the scope of the tax base, in some instances, beyond that found
in the tax law of the United States.
This Article is divided into two sections. Section I compares and con-
trasts the history and structure of British and American income tax law,
emphasizing conflicting views of income, deductions, losses, business tax-
ation, and capital gains and losses. Section II examines the concepts of
realization and taxable event as they have developed from the structure
and history of the two systems.
I. THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN
INCOME TAXATION
A. United Kingdom: The First Comprehensive Income Tax System
Income taxation began in the United Kingdom due to the serious need
for revenue to support war efforts during the Napoleonic Wars.27 In
1799, the United Kingdom adopted what has often been called Pitt's tax,
a comprehensive tax on the income of residents from real property, per-
sonal property or any other property, and income from any "profession,
office, stipend, pension, employment, trade or vocation."28 It also in-
cluded any income not falling under any of the specific rules,29 including
income arising or sourced both inside and outside the United Kingdom.3"
The tax was progressive, including several graduated rates of tax up to a
maximum rate of ten percent.31 A single return was required for income
from all sources.32
27. See 2 STEPHEN DOWELL, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND TAXES IN ENGLAND 208-
09 (3d ed. Frank Cass & Co. 1965) (1884).
28. 3 id. at 92-93 (citing Income Tax Act, 1799, 39 Geo. 3, ch. 13 (Eng.)).
29. The Act provided for the following income to be charged:
I. Income from land, including houses, which comprised -
1. Income of owners;
2. Income of tenants; and
3. Income of mesne lessors under demises in consideration of fines.
It. Income from personal property, and from trades, professions, offices, pen-
sions, stipends, employments, and vocations.
III. Income arising out of Great Britain.
IV. Income not falling under any of the foregoing rules.
Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
30. See id. at 92-93.
31. See id. at 94.
32. See id. at 93-98 (providing an example of the return).
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The United Kingdom's flirtation with a nonschedular income tax sys-
tem was short-lived. In 1803, Addington's Property and Income Tax was
enacted.33 The system introduced by this tax was in reaction to strong
taxpayer objections to the previous system that forced the taxpayer to
disclose his entire "circumstances in life" on one return to one govern-
ment official. 4 Thus, in 1803, schedular income taxation was born. Add-
ington's tax required a taxpayer to file particular returns for income
based on a particular source for that income.3" In 1803, there were five
schedules,36 which became the basis of the United Kingdom's modern
income tax system. Addington's tax retained exemptions for small in-
comes in the aggregate and a graduated rate system.37 Thus, although the
system was schedular, it still required the amalgamation of income for
assessing the final taxable amount.
B. The Birth of Income Taxation in the United States: Comprehensive
Income Taxation at Its Zenith
Consistent with the origin of income tax in the United Kingdom, the
first national income tax in the United States was instituted during a time
of fiscal crisis.3 8 The first income tax was enacted in 1861 at the com-
mencement of the Civil War.39 The 1861 Act was simple, the charge to
tax being less than half a page.' Though the 1861 Act was sparse on
definitions, the charge was to tax income to the fullest extent.'
33. See id. at 99 (citing Property and Income Tax Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, ch. 122 (Eng.)).
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 99-101. The schedules were Schedule A (land), Schedule B (farming),
Schedule C (public funds), Schedule D (trades, professions, vocations), and Schedule E
(public office or employment of profit, pensions, stipends). See id.
37. See id. at 101-02.
38. See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 430-31 (1911).
39. See id.; Revenue Act of 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (repealed 1862).
40. The 1861 Act provided:
That, from and after the first day of January next, there shall be levied, collected,
and paid, upon the annual income of every person residing in the United States,
whether such income is derived from any kind of property, or from any profes-
sion, trade, employment, or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere,
or from any other source whatever, if such annual income exceeds the sum of
eight hundred dollars, a tax of three per centum on the amount of such excess of
such income above eight hundred dollars ....
§ 49, 12 Stat. at 309.
41. See id. Notable exceptions from an ideal comprehensive income base included
gifts and bequests of real property and gains from the sale of real property that was not
purchased within two years of the sale. But see Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349 § 27, 28 Stat.
509, 553 (specifically including these items in "income" to be taxed under the Act); see also
infra note 61.
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Graduated rates first appeared in the 1862 amendments to the original
Act.42 The rates were three and five percent, and the first six hundred
dollars of income were exempt from tax.43 Rates were greatly increased
in 1865, to five and ten percent. 44 This first experiment with income taxa-
tion terminated, as scheduled, in 1872, amid considerable controversy
over the wisdom of continuing the tax.45
The United States's next encounter with income tax came in 1894.46
The 1894 Act provided for a two percent tax on all incomes above four
thousand.47 The 1894 Act defined income fairly comprehensively and in-
cluded for the first and only time "money and the value of all personal
property acquired by gift or inheritance., 48 The 1894 Act was short-lived,
however, because the United States Supreme Court in 1895 found signifi-
cant provisions to constitute an unconstitutional direct tax.49
Thirty-six states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, thereby making income taxation a reality.5" The Sixteenth
Amendment ended the debate as to whether the federal government had
the power to impose an income tax on its citizens.51 However, the true
starting place for modern income taxation in America is the 1913 law that
implemented the Sixteenth Amendment.52
The 1913 Act continued the tradition of a comprehensive tax base, in-
cluding both domestic and foreign income, and a progressive system char-
acterized by graduated rates. 53 Except for the fact that the 1913 Act
excluded gifts and inheritances,54 which Congress was considering treat-
42. See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473 (amended 1865).
43. See id.
44. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 479.
45. See ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913 53-56 (1993).
46. See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553. The Supreme Court
declared the Act largely unconstitutional in 1895. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583-84, modified by 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
47. See § 27, 28 Stat. at 509.
48. Id. § 28.
49. See Pollock, 157 U.S. at 583-84.
50. See JOHN F. WiT-rE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 75 (1985).
51. The Sixteenth Amendment provides, "The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend.
XVI.
52. See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1-
9722 (1994)).
53. See § 2, 38 Stat. at 166-81.
54. See WrITE, supra note 50, at 78.
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ing in a separate tax structure,55 it comprehensively defined income56 and
fully taxed capital gains. 57 Moveover, the 1913 Act explicitly defined de-
ductible expenditures for the first time.58 A somewhat unusual feature of
the 1913 Act (vis-A-vis current United States tax law) was its heavy reli-
ance on the withholding of the base rate of tax at its source.59 In this
55. See id.
56. The 1913 Act defined net income as follows:
That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter al-
lowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income
derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of whatever
kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade,
commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out
of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property, also from
interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any lawful business car-
ried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever, including the income from but not the value of property acquired by
gift, bequest, devise, or descent ....
§ 2, 38 Stat. at 167.
57. See id. Differential rates for capital gains did not become law until 1921. See
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 227, 232-33 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-88 (1994)).
58. The 1913 Act defined allowable deductions as follows:
That in computing net income for the purpose of the normal tax there shall be
allowed as deductions: First, the necessary expenses actually paid in carrying on
any business, not including personal, living, or family expenses; second, all inter-
est paid within the year by a taxable person on indebtedness; third, all national,
State, county, school, and municipal taxes paid within the year, not including
those assessed against local benefits; fourth, losses actually sustained during the
year, incurred in trade or arising from fires, storms, or shipwreck, and not com-
pensated for by insurance or otherwise; fifth, debts due to the taxpayer actually
ascertained to be worthless and charged off within the year; sixth, a reasonable
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property arising out of its use or
employment in the business, not to exceed, in the case of mines, 5 per centum of
the gross value at the mine of the output for the year for which the computation is
made, but no deduction shall be made for any amount of expense of restoring
property or making good the exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or has
been made ....
§ 2, 38 Stat. at 167.
59. The 1913 Act provided for withholding of income tax at the source by:
All persons, firms, copartnerships, companies, corporations, joint-stock compa-
nies or associations, and insurance companies, in whatever capacity acting, includ-
ing lessees or mortgagors of real or personal property, trustees acting in any trust
capacity, executors, administrators, agents, receivers, conservators, employers,
and all officers and employees of the United States having the control, receipt,
custody, disposal, or payment of interest, rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annui-
ties, compensation, remuneration, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable
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narrow instance, the British practice may have influenced United States
law.
60
C. An Elementary Structural Overview
When one looks at the origins of income taxation in both the United
States and the United Kingdom, it is perhaps noteworthy that both sys-
tems began with a comprehensive tax base surprisingly close to the ideal
of the economists. For different reasons, both systems excluded gifts or
inheritances, 61 and the United Kingdom did not tax capital gains.
Both systems initially adopted a synthetic or global income tax struc-
ture as opposed to an analytical or schedular one. Synthetic or global
taxation begins with a holistic approach to income; income is treated the
same no matter what its kind or source. Moreover, synthetic taxation
often is linked to residence as opposed to a source principle of interna-
tional taxation.62 Schedular systems, on the other hand, separate income
into its constituent parts; they "take as their starting point solely the
60. See H.R. REP. No. 63-5, at 1-6 (1939), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 1. In its report, the
House Ways and Means Committee stressed that it had carefully considered the income
tax systems of other countries. See id. at 3. The Committee's statement is worth consider-
ing today:
In the light of the experience of other countries, we recommend the passage of
this income-tax provision, in the confident belief that as soon as this tax and its
administrative machinery become fairly understood by the people and adjusted
by the country its operation and effects will meet with as much satisfaction as any
tax law. The tariff taxes, being invisible and intangible, are paid into the Treasury
without any accurate knowledge on the part of the taxpayer, either as to the
amount he pays to the Treasury or the much larger amount he at the same time
pays to the protected manufacturer. It is well, therefore, that the people should
know, at least as to the substantial portion of their taxes, the true amount paid.
All taxes, National, State, and local, come alike off the American people.
A personal knowledge of the amount of taxes required of the people would
more closely enlist their interest and active cooperation in all the affairs of gov-
ernment, and especially with respect to revenues and expenditures. The adoption
of the proposed tax, therefore, would assist in arousing and sustaining general
public interest in behalf of economy at all times.
Id.
61. Although gifts had been taxed in the United States under the 1894 Act, see Act of
Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 102 (1994)),
Congress anticipated in 1913 that gifts might more appropriately be the subject of an estate
and gift transfer tax. See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167; see also supra notes
54-55 and accompanying text. In the United Kingdom, gifts are not taxed to the recipient
because they do not have a source.
62. See ARNOLD A. KNEcHTLE, BASIC PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW 36-
37 (W.E. Weisfiog trans., 1979). Knechtle refers to this as the "residence-, universality-,
totality- principle." ld.
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sources of income and restrict themselves to taxing incomes which origi-
nate from internal, domestic sources.
63
The United States has, at least in form, consistently followed a syn-
thetic approach to income taxation.6 In several areas, however, schedu-
63. Id. at 37. Source taxation applies to income on the basis of the income's relation
to the taxing jurisdiction. Residence or status taxation taxes income on the basis of the
relation of the taxpayer to the taxing jurisdiction. See id. at 36-37. The schedular system
adopted later in the United Kingdom, however, never limited itself to domestic source
income, but included foreign source income earned by residents.
64. Corporate taxation in America, the classic system that taxes income first at the
corporate level, and second, at the shareholder level, may, upon first consideration, appear
schedular in nature. This treatment of corporate income, however, springs from quite a
different conceptual starting point. The theory behind economic double taxation is that
the corporation is truly a separate taxpayer apart from its owners as a result of the privi-
lege of limited liability. Under this scheme, neither the income nor the net loss of the
enterprise is directly attributable to the shareholders due to the limitations on the share-
holders' economic risk. Income is not the shareholders' until distributed; loss is possible
only through diminution of the value of the owners' stock.
Modem corporate taxation became law in 1909, four years before the passage of the
Revenue Act of 1913. See Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Despite the characterization of the corporate
tax as a tax on income, the tax withstood constitutional challenge. See Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U.S. 107, 144-47, 151-52 (1911), overruled on different grounds by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The tax withstood constitutional chal-
lenge due to the Supreme Court's conclusion that the tax was an excise tax on the "doing
of business." Id. at 145-46.
Recently, considerable attention has been paid to the reform of the corporate tax system
in the United States. Various proposals have been suggested for the integration of the
corporate and individual tax systems. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT ON
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYsTEMs (1992) [hereinafter RE.
PORT ON INTEGRATION]; John K. McNulty, Corporate Income Tax Reform in the United
States: Proposals for Integration of the Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, and Interna-
tional Aspects, 12 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 161 (1994) (analyzing American Law Institute
and U.S. Treasury Department tax reform proposals). Integration models have, as their
starting point, the view that the income earned by a corporation is ultimately that of its
shareholders. REPORT ON INTEGRATION, supra, at vii ("[O]ur tax system taxes corporate
profits distributed to shareholders at least twice - once at the shareholder level and once at
the corporate level.").
Entity taxation, however, can have some schedular features. Under current U.S. law, a
complete pass-through entity model of taxation, like partnership taxation and Subchapter
S corporate taxation, is essentially synthetic because the income or loss is integrated with
the owner's other income. Partnership taxation is mildly schedular due principally to the
law's restriction on the deduction of losses to the partner's basis in his partnership interest
(outside basis), and the Internal Revenue Code's treatment of some transactions between
partners and their partnerships as transactions between strangers. See I.R.C. §§ 704(d),
707(a) (1994). Subchapter S corporate taxation is more schedular due to the shareholders'
inability to include corporate debt in their stocks' basis for purposes of loss allowance. See
id. § 1367. Corporate integration as found in Europe, or in proposals advanced by the U.S.
Treasury, however, is true scheduler taxation. See generally REPORT ON INTEGRATION,
supra. Corporate integration includes the segregation of income from shareholders and its
separate taxation, the inability of shareholders to deduct operating losses of the corpora-
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lar principles have crept into the system, several of which will be
examined in this section. 65 The United Kingdom, on the other hand,
quickly abandoned a synthetic approach with the adoption of Adding-
ton's schedular system. In analyzing the impact of this structure on taxa-
tion in United Kingdom, it is helpful to compare it with pure schedular
taxation, and to see where the United Kingdom differed.
The schedular system adopted in the United Kingdom started with the
concept of income from things.66 Thus, critical to understanding the Brit-
ish system is the concept of source. Income is taxed only if it has a
source, and only if that source is enumerated in the taxing act.67
Although the doctrine of source could be applied either in a synthetic or
an analytical system, 68 "[h]istorically, the source concept is probably
rooted in schedular income tax systems.",69 By contrast, the American
system taxes income from "whatever source derived.",
71
The choice of system may ultimately make no difference. Total income
should be the same under the source and accretion concepts if every
source of income was defined comprehensively. This statement holds
true when source is not meant to be a limiting feature of taxation. The
United States system views source in this way.
tion, and, in most cases, the application of rates to corporate income different from those
rates applied to the individual shareholders. See id.
65. Examples include various loss limitation provisions such as the passive activity
loss rules, I.R.C. § 469, rules concerning capital losses, id. § 1211, rules concerning invest-
ment interest, id. § 163(d), and rules limiting certain deductions to the amount at risk, id.
§ 465.
66. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (describing Simons's theory of the
concept of income from things).
67. See Brown v. National Provident Inst., [19211 2 App. Cas. 222, 227 (appeal taken
from K.B.). National Provident was originally decided by the High Court of Justice, King's
Bench Division. Under the British system of courts, tax cases begin at the trial level, where
General or Special Commissioners decide the issues. The first appeal of the decision of the
trial court is heard by the High Court. The second appeal is heard by the Court of Ap-
peals. If granted a final appeal, the parties are heard before the House of Lords. See THE
CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF TAXATION, BuTTERWORTHS UK TAX GUIDE, 1995-96, at 45-49
(14th ed. 1995) [hereinafter BUrrERWORTHS]. The form of the modern English judgment,
dating from 1830, gives "the detailed opinion of the Chief Justice or the presiding Judge,
the opinion of the other Lords or judges on the Bench, in so far as they add anything to
that of the President, and the opinion of the dissentientes." HENRI LtvY-ULLMANN, THE
ENGLISH LEGAL TRADITION 119 (M. Mitchell trans., Frederic M. Goodby ed., 1935).
68. See Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913) (holding
that "'income' may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined"); see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (adopting Stratton's
definition). Thus, the Supreme Court suggested that income must have a source.
69. R. MANSURY, THE INDONESIAN INCOME TAX: A CASE STUDY IN THE REFORM OF
A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 52 (1992).
70. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).
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Where source derives its context from schedules, however, synthetic
and analytical systems do not unite. Schedular taxation gives nations the
option of being highly selective in the kinds of income taxed, and they
may easily use schedular taxation to tax different income at different
rates. The process of assigning income to schedules limits taxable income
unless there is a category for all other income. Allowable deductions are
easily fine tuned for each kind of income. Schedules are meant to pro-
vide boundaries, and boundaries change the complexion of income.
Contrary to the classical notion of schedular taxation, income tax in the
United Kingdom was meant to be a comprehensive system of income tax-
ation. Internationally, it adopted a residence principle and has main-
tained it ever since. The switch from Pitt's synthetic tax to Addington's
schedular tax was intended to change administration, not substance.
Schedule D, the most significant schedule in Addington's tax since it
dealt with trade and business income and the professions, had a sweeping
clause that taxed persons on income from any sources other than those
specifically charged under the other schedules.71 Yet, interpretation
transformed the doctrine of the source into a doctrine of limitation.
Thus, one limitation on a comprehensive income tax base in the United
Kingdom came less from the structure chosen than from the view of the
definition of income. The British system started with the concept of in-
come from things and additionally required that these sources be activi-
ties pursued for profit.72 Source in the United Kingdom, therefore, was
defined subjectively as a thing or activity that reasonable men pursue for
profit. The catchall provision of Schedule D also incorporated this con-
cept. The British courts consistently interpreted the catchall provision as
including only items that are comparable to items taxed from enumerated
sources.73 The notion of income from things also meant that the income
must be separate or severable from its source, and that the source must
endure even though income might fluctuate. Use values were considered
income but the property itself was not.74 Thus, the category of income
from transactions, or the sale or exchange of capital assets (non-business
property), was not recognized in the British system. Income from the
sale of property was taxed only if it arose from the conduct of a trade.75
71. See DOWELL, supra note 27, at 100-01.
72. See generally FRANCIS EUGENE LABRIE, THE MEANING OF INCOME IN THE LAW
OF INCOME TAX (1953).
73. See Graham v. Greene, 2 K.B. 37, 41 (1925) (Eng.); see also BU=TERWORTHS,
supra note 67, at 577-78.
74. See, e.g., Brown v. National Provident Inst., [1921] 2 App. Cas. 222,245-46 (appeal
taken from K.B.); see also supra text accompanying notes 16-17 and note 69.
75. See infra note 151.
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Taxation of capital gains only came about in the United Kingdom in
1965.76
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the courts played a
major role in defining and determining the parameters of the tax system.
The defining characteristic of analysis by United States courts was the
concept of income, or, whether the taxpayer had gain. By contrast, courts
in the United Kingdom "tried to enumerate the source of income as a
substitute for defining income." 77
One of the most difficult problems facing income tax systems is distin-
guishing between personal and profit-making activities. In the United
Kingdom, since source was defined in terms of profit, personal activities
were excluded from the scope of the income tax law.78 In the United
States, however, gain was income no matter the source. In the United
Kingdom, the appropriate analysis was of profit from enumerated activi-
ties.79 In the United States, the approach to net income was bifurcated
into conceptually distinct categories of income and deductions.8" The dis-
tinction between personal and profit-making activities was irrelevant to
the question of income. This distinction became an essential element in
the United States, however, in testing the deductibility of expenditures
which are restricted, in the main, to profit-making activities.
81
1. The Consequences of Starting Points
United Kingdom law, since 1803, has provided that income is taxed if it
falls within one of the Schedules. 2 This system has been implemented
76. See Finance Act, 1965, ch. 25, § 19 (Eng.).
77. Yoseph Edrey, Income Tax Base: Moving from the British Source Doctrine to the
"American Concept of Accretion to Wealth" - the Israeli Experience, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
427, 432 (1990) (quoting A. NAMDAR, TAX LAWS: THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW, INCOME TAX,
CORPORATE TAX, CAPITAL GAIN TAX 41-42 (1985)). Indeed, one of the major criticisms
levelled at the British income tax system is its lack of a coherent view of income. See, e.g.,
J.A. KAY & M.A. KING, THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 70-71 (2d ed. 1980).
78. For consideration of this statement in the capital gains context, see infra text ac-
companying notes 320-324.
79. See, e.g., Finance Act, 1995, ch. 4, § 39 (Eng.) (providing schedular taxation).
80. See John Tiley, Judicial Anti-avoidance Doctrines: The US Alternatives, 1987 BRIT.
TAX REV. 180, 187.
81. The principal sections for deductions are I.R.C. § 162 (1994) amended by Pub. L.
No. 104-7, 109 Stat. 93, § 1(a)-(b) (1995) (allowing deductions for trade or business ex-
penses) and I.R.C. § 212 (allowing deductions for the production of income or investment).
Certain personal expenditures are deductible in some circumstances: mortgage interest,
I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)-(h)(3), state and local taxes (excluding sales taxes), id. § 164, and chari-
table contributions, id. § 170.
82. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 1 (Eng.) (setting out the
schedular tax system); see also supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (describing Add-
ington's Property and Income Tax).
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through a series of acts dealing with activities in separate categories with
little need to provide unifying principles applicable to all Schedules.83 In
United States law, however, taxes include "all income from whatever
source derived."' American legislation has been designed as a unified
code updated and synthesized continuously. Somewhat similar to a civil
code, the Internal Revenue Code's major provisions, viz the general rules
for income and deduction, consist of broad pronouncements with undif-
ferentiated content.85 Such direction has given courts and governmental
administrative bodies great latitude to interpret or supply content in or-
der to deal with evolving economic conditions. The courts, in exercising
their powers, assumed that Congress meant to exercise "the full measure
of its taxing powers"86 under the Sixteenth Amendment. Thus, the criti-
cal theoretical debate in the development of American tax law concerned
the nature of income. Any possible limitation that the notion of source
might have had on this doctrine was finally put to rest by the United
States Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.87 In do-
ing so, the Court provided an often quoted definition of income: "undeni-
able accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion.'"88
In the United Kingdom, however, the source of income became a dom-
inant concern. This may well have been caused by the heavy reliance the
United Kingdom system places on collecting tax at the source rather than
primarily through a tax return system. Today, except in the case of em-
ployment income and the taxation of foreign taxpayers,89 the United
States system places little reliance on collection of tax at the source.
The doctrine of the source first requires the identification of a statutory
source, such as specific property, trade, or employment, and second, the
83. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch.1 (Eng.) (stating in the preamble
that the Act's purpose was to consolidate previous enactments).
84. I.R.C. § 61(a).
85. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 61, 162 (1994) (discussing the broad definition of income and
the application of various tax deductions).
86. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331,334,337-38 (1940) (finding broad congressional
power in the interpretation of income as defined by the Revenue Act of 1934).
87. 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955) (supporting the liberal construction of income as Con-
gress's intent); see also supra note 68 (discussing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920),
where the Supreme Court suggested that income must have a source).
88. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431.
89. See I.R.C. § 3402 (1994) (employment); id. §§ 1441, 1442 (foreign taxpayers). The
principal withholding system in the United Kingdom is the PAYE system, which provides
for withholding taxes on employment income. See Finance Act, 1994, ch. 9, §§ 125-133
(Eng.). It differs from the American withholding system for employment, I.R.C. § 3402, in
that it precisely measures an employee's tax obligation in order to obviate the need for a
tax return and any post taxable year adjustments. See id.
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careful linking of a possible taxable amount to that source.9" A corollary
of the rule is that there can be only one appropriate schedule for a partic-
ular item of income.91
a. The Absence of an Appropriate Source
In several instances, United Kingdom courts have recognized the pres-
ence of income but have concluded that it is not taxable under any Sched-
ule. In Graham v. Greene,92 for example, the taxpayer had considerable
winnings from betting on horses.93 Indeed, betting was practically his
only means of livelihood.94 The question presented was whether the tax-
payer's winnings were taxable under Schedule D as either profits and
gains of a trade (Case I), vocation (Case II) or other income (Case VI).95
Recognizing that the winnings were income, 96 the court nevertheless con-
cluded that they were not gains or profits from a taxable source.9 7 Even
though carried on regularly, the taxpayer's betting activity was not a
trade or vocation, the court reasoned, because a bet was an irrational
agreement.98 The court recognized that a bookmaker, on the other hand,
is in trade, and is, therefore, taxable under Schedule D.99 The book-
maker's profit is made by offsetting the risks associated with different
bets.' If the court had recognized gambling as a trade, an undesirable
consequence would have been that gambling losses could be freely de-
ducted and could be used to offset profits from other activities.' 0 '
In the United States, tax law specifically addresses this latter problem
by limiting deductions for wagering losses to the amount of wagering
gains.102 Furthermore, under United States law, the tax issue typically
begins and ends with the question of income. Thus, taxable income re-
90. See Mitchell & Edon v. Ross, 1962 App. Cas. 814, 838 (appeal taken from C.A.).
91. See Fry v. Salisbury House Estate, Ltd., 1930 App. Cas. 432, 439 (appeal taken
from C.A.).
92. [1925] 2 K.B. 37.
93. See id. at 38.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 39.
96. In conclusion, Rowlatt, J., remarked: "All I can say is that in my judgment the
income which this gentleman succeeded in making is not profits or gains .... " Id. at 42.
97. See id. The activity of racing thoroughbred horses is also considered to be a per-
sonal activity, not a trade. Winnings, therefore, are not taxable. See Sharkey v. Wernher,
1956 App. Cas. 58, 67 (appeal taken from C.A.); see also discussion infra part II.C.1.
98. See Graham, [1925] 2 K.B. at 39-40.
99. See id. at 41; see also Partridge v. Mallandaine, [1887] 18 Q.B. 276, 277-78.
100. See Graham, [1925] 2 K.B. at 41-42.
101. See id. at 40.
102. See I.R.C. § 165(d) (1994).
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suits from gambling simply because it represents the inflow of an eco-
nomic benefit.
Windfalls in the nature of found cash or goods are also not taxed under
the British tax system because there is no taxable source. 10 3 This result
differs from United States law, which dictates that found goods or trea-
sure trove are, indeed, taxable income because they represent inflows of
economic benefits, even when the taxpayer may not have absolute
ownership. 10
4
In the United Kingdom, the most important source of income not cov-
ered by the schedules was historically income the disposition of capital
assets produced.' 5 As Judge Rowlatt stated in Graham:
A person who buys an object which subsequently turns out to be
worth more than he gave for it, and which he sells, does not
thereby make a profit or gain for income tax purposes. But he
can organize himself to do that in a commercial and mercantile
way, and the profits which emerge are taxable profits, not of the
transaction, but of the trade. 10 6
b. Causation-Income and Its Source
Due to the source requirement, some British doctrines prevent taxa-
tion if the income in question is not sufficiently related to the particular
source. Three employment cases decided by the courts illustrate this
problem.10 7
In Hochstrasser v. Mayes ,108 an employer agreed to reimburse his em-
ployee for any loss incurred on the sale of the employee's residence when
the employer required the employee to move. 9 Schedule E charges an
employee on emoluments of an office or employment."0 To be charge-
able, an emolument must be made "in reference to the services the em-
ployee renders by virtue of his office, and it must be something in the
nature of a reward for services past, present or future.""' The court con-
cluded that since the employee had otherwise been fairly paid for his
103. See Graham, [1925] 2 K.B. at 39.
104. See Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 5 (N.D. Ohio. 1969), affd, 428 F.2d
812 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing Rev. Rul. 61, 1953-1 C.B. 17).
105. For further discussion of the current law on capital gains in the United Kingdom
and the United States, see infra Part II.C.3.
106. Graham, [1925] 2 K.B. at 41.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 108-22.
108. 1960 App. Cas. 376 (appeal taken from C.A.).
109. See id. at 378-79.
110. Income and Corporations Tax Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 19 (Eng.).
111. Hochstrasser, 1960 App. Cas. at 388.
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work, the payment was not a payment for services, but a payment for the
loss and, hence, nontaxable.' 12
In Pritchard v. Arundale,"3 the court concluded that a signing bonus,
given to a prospective employee as encouragement to leave his present
employment, was not sufficiently related to the services to be performed,
and therefore, was not taxable.114 Lord Simonds's statement, cited in
that case, illustrates well the philosophy that prevails in the United
Kingdom:
[I]t was not for the subject to prove that his case fell within ex-
ceptions arbitrarily inferred from the statute, but for the Crown
to prove that the tax was exigible. After a little discussion, I
think that [counsel for the Crown] accepted that the true issue
was not the twofold question whether the benefit fell within the
taxable category of remuneration for services (as it may briefly
be described) or within the non-taxable category of personal
gift, but a single question, namely, whether or not it fell within
the taxable category of remuneration for services. "Personal
gift" is thus not a category which has to be defined or explained,
but merely an example of a transaction which will not fall within
the taxable category of remuneration for services. In other
words, the question is not one of which of two strait-jackets the
transaction best fits, but whether it comes within the statutory
language, or else, failing to do so, falls into the undefined residu-
ary class of cases not caught by the statute." 5
In Moore v. Griffiths," 6 a professional football player received a bonus
from the Football Association, an organization of which his club was a
member, as well as a bonus from a private company for winning the
World Cup Competition in 1966.117 The court recognized that the tax-
payer's relation to the Football Association was in a sense an employ-
ment relation. A study that simply reports particular solutions might be
described as "descriptive comparative law.""' 8 In the case of the private
concern, however, there was no employment relation and "[t]he prizes
were plainly offered in order to publici[z]e the company's products." 1 9
Because the employee performed services without any expectation of
benefits from either organization, the bonuses were in the nature of a
112. See id. at 396-97.
113. [1971] 1 Ch. 229.
114. See id. at 241.
115. Id. at 237 (citations omitted).
116. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1024 (Ch.).
117. See id. at 1027.
118. See id. at 1034.
119. Id. at 1035.
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windfall, rather than consideration for services rendered and, thus, were
not taxable income.12 °
In the United States, courts might reach different conclusions under the
facts of Hochstrasser and Pritchard as to whether the payments were suf-
ficiently related to employment. Under United States law, the context-
employment versus trade-might affect the overall tax result.121 Such
classifications, however, are irrelevant in determining whether the pay-
ments are included in the definition of taxable income. The receipt of an
economic benefit is taxable income irrespective of its relation to a partic-
ular source. All the receipts in the cases discussed above would be con-
sidered income in the United States. Although United States courts
might agree that a transfer from a third party, as in Moore, is not a pay-
ment for services, such a transfer would still be taxed as income under the
general principle that even prizes and awards are income.1 22
2. Integration Versus Disintegration
Let us review the essence of the differences between the starting points
found in United States global and United Kingdom schedular taxation,
which are located at opposite ends of the spectrum. The United States
starts with a comprehensive scheme that treats all income alike irrespec-
tive of its sources and generally allows deductions of any type as long as
the expenditures relate to profit-making activities. The United Kingdom
taxes income only from particular sources, and even though these sources
are defined fairly comprehensively, segregates computations from each
other. The United Kingdom grants deductions only on a Schedule-by-
Schedule, and sometimes case-by-case, basis. Nevertheless, the British
system today is in many ways an integrated system, just as the American
system has incorporated many elements of schedular taxation. As will be
shown, the British system's continued reliance on schedular principles
often ensures the integrity of the general taxing scheme. For the same
reasons, schedular principles have been introduced in the United States
in an attempt to cure perceived abuse and to ensure the integrity of the
system.
120. See id. at 1034-35.
121. For example, a person's duty to withhold depends on that classification. See I.R.C.
§§ 3401-3406 (1994).
122. See Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428, 440 (1967), in which an American
football player was taxed on the value of a car provided by a magazine in recognition of his
exceptional play in a National Football League championship game. See also I.R.C. § 74
(1994) ("[Gjross income includes amounts received as prizes and awards.").
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The most important impetus to integration is progressive taxation. 123
Fair progressive taxation depends upon the amalgamation of all income
for the purpose of applying tax rates. In the United Kingdom today, all
income is combined for purposes of applying graduated income tax rates.
Even capital gains, which are not chargeable as income per se, and are
subject to their own separate tax regime, are now integrated and taxed at
the taxpayer's highest marginal income tax rate. 24
Once incomes are combined for purposes of applying rates, one must
ask if only positive net incomes from each schedule are combined, or
whether net losses are also utilizable. Before answering that question,
though, one should consider how a net loss can be created. Paramount to
consideration of this problem is the role of depreciation and interest de-
ductions in the tax system because they are the principle sources of net
losses from profit-making activities.
In general, capital allowances or depreciation deductions in the United
Kingdom are limited to trades under Schedule D, Case 1.125 There are
two limited exceptions. Schedule A, which deals with the holding of real
property, permits capital allowances for machinery and equipment, 26 but
not for buildings. 127 Thus, capital allowances are not permitted for other
profit-making activities, including professions and employment.
Interest expense is generally deductible for trades, professions, and, in
appropriate cases, employment. 28 For purposes of the activity of holding
real property, interest is an allowable deduction on loans of thirty thou-
sand pounds or less when incurred to purchase or improve one's personal
residence.' 29 Another provision allowing a taxpayer to deduct interest in
the case of commercial lettings was repealed in 1995.13°
Schedule F includes corporate distributions or dividends of resident
companies subject to credit for corporate income taxes paid. 3' Stock is a
123. A progressive tax is one where the average rate of tax on all income increases as
the income of the taxpayer increases. This is usually accomplished by means of a gradu-
ated rate structure.
124. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, ch. 12, § 4 (Eng.).
125. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1 §§ 74, 82 (Eng.) (addressing
tax deductions as applied to residents and non-residents); see also BUrIERWORTHs, supra
note 67, at 442.
126. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, § 32.
127. Buildings are not considered to be wasting assets when their useful life exceeds
fifty years. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act § 44. Nevertheless, even buildings with
a useful life less than fifty years are not depreciable under Schedule A because the deduc-
tion is not specifically allowed. See id.
128. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act §§ 74, 82, 356 (amended 1995).
129. See id. §§ 354, 355, 357.
130. See Finance Act, 1995, ch. 4, § 42 (Eng.).
131. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, § 231(2).
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non-depreciable asset, and Schedule F does not permit the deduction of
interest incurred to carry stock investments. 132 For purposes of capital
gains taxation, interest is not treated as part of the allowable deductible
cost of an asset.133
In the United Kingdom, losses from activities most likely arise in the
context of a trade. Losses are less likely to arise in the case of rental
activity and are very unlikely to arise in the case of employment. Since
interest is not allowed as a deductible expense, losses are not possible in
the case of stock ownership. However, the gain or loss from the sale or
disposition of stock assets is subject to capital gains taxation, but not in-
come taxation.
In integrating income under the British system for purposes of applying
progressive tax rates, operating losses can be used only to offset other
income when such losses arise from the carrying on of a trade (Schedule
D, Case I), a profession or vocation (Schedule D, Case II), or employ-
ment (Schedule E).1'3  A further hurdle for loss relief, which allows In-
land Revenue to question the bona fides of the activity, requires that the
trade be undertaken on a commercial basis and have a reasonable expec-
tation of profit.1 35 No other losses can be used to offset income in
general.
In keeping with principles of synthetic taxation, United States tax law
did not historically distinguish among profit-making activities. 136 Thus,
depreciation and interest expenditures are freely deductible. 37 Under a
132. See id. § 20.
133. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, ch. 12, § 38(3) (Eng.). In the case of
companies, when interest is required to be capitalized as part of the cost of buildings, struc-
tures, or works, such interest is treated as a cost for capital gains purposes. See id. § 40.
134. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act § 380. Losses produced by transactions
taxed under Schedule D, Case VI (other income) can only be offset by gains within that
section. See id. § 392.
135. See id. § 381(4). Under U.S. law, the hobby loss provision similarly limits a tax-
payer's deductions to the amount of his or her income if the activity is "not engaged in for
profit." I.R.C. § 183(a) (1994).
136. In 1954, Congress passed I.R.C. § 212, which allowed individual taxpayers to take
deductions for expenses incurred in investment activities. Section 212 overruled the U.S.
Supreme Court's limiting decision in Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), which
held that expenses incurred in looking after one's investments are not incurred in "carrying
on a business" and are, therefore, not deductible. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217-18. Also, capi-
tal gains taxation became an exception to this rule starting in 1921. See Witte, supra note
50, at 91.
137. See I.R.C. § 162, amended by Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 1(a)-(b), 109 Stat. 93, 93 (1995)
(allowing a deduction for "ordinary and necessary" business expenses); id. § 163 (indebt-
edness interest); id. § 167 (depreciation of property "used in trade or business" or "held for
the production of income"); id. § 212 ("ordinary and necessary" investment expenses). In-
terest on a mortgage on one's personal residence is also deductible under United States
law. See id. § 163(h)(3.
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global system, there is no restriction on the deductibility of net losses
against any income. Nor is there any reason to identify such losses as a
special category other than as a potential carryover deduction to another
year. Under a global system, the charge to tax is for net income from all
the activities of the taxpayer within the taxable period. Income and de-
duction are neither differentiated nor segregated with regard to source.
Due to varying policy choices, the United States Congress, however, has
over the years instituted several qualifications to the ideal system first
introduced in 1913.138
Several provisions introduce schedular notions. Under these provi-
sions, interest and depreciation are still generally deductible subject to
schedular notions of segregation of activities. For example, taxpayers
often finance the acquisition of investment assets such as stocks, bonds,
and other interest-bearing investments. A possible profit expectation is a
trade-off between the tax savings generated by current deductions and
the tax cost of future income, which might be recognized as capital gain.
United States law now limits the interest deduction attributable to such
assets to the amount of the investment income, thus preventing a net loss
that could result from such interest deductions offsetting other income. 39
The law provides that the interest deductions that create the net loss are
suspended and can be carried forward and utilized under the same proce-
dure in a later year. 40
The passive activity loss rules limit deductions even more broadly. 141
These provisions limit the deductibility of net losses from ordinary busi-
ness activities when the taxpayer does not materially participate in the
activity. 142 The rationale is that taxpayers who do not devote sufficient
energy to an activity may be using the activity primarily for the purpose
of generating losses that would typically offset other taxable income the
taxpayer generated. Significantly, the real estate activity of holding de-
preciable rental property (a building or improvement) in the United
138. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
139. See I.R.C. § 163(d)(1).
140. See id. § 163(d)(2).
141. See id. § 469.
142. See id. "Material participation" under § 469 has been partially defined as "any
work done by an individual (without regard to the capacity in which the individual does the
work) in connection with an activity in which the individual owns an interest at the time
the work is done." Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5(f) (1996); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.46a-5T
(1996). 0
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States' 43 is defined as a per se passive activity."' Generally, in the United
States, § 469 limits net losses from passive activities to the extent of net
gains from other passive activities.'45
3. Capital Gains or Losses
Until recently, the United Kingdom did not recognize capital gains as a
form of income. 4 6 The United States, on the other hand, originally
treated capital gains like any other form of income.' 47 Today, however,
taxation of capital gains in the United States is a hybrid of schedular and
global principles. Thus, there are several similarities between laws gov-
erning the taxation of capital gains in the United Kingdom and the
United States.
The Revenue Act of 1921 changed capital gains taxation forever in the
United States by introducing a special maximum tax rate for capital
gains.' 48 The present United States system is similar in that capital trans-
actions are segregated from other income. Under both the British and
American systems, the deductibility of capital losses is restricted to total
capital gains.' 49 As previously noted, the British system taxes capital
gains at regular rates, 5 ° whereas American law still provides for a special
maximum rate.151
The United Kingdom system adds net capital gain to income in order
to determine the appropriate rate of tax. Allowable operating losses can
143. See I.R.C. § 167, amended by Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 304(a), 109 Stat. 803, 943
(1995) (describing the general rules governing applicability); id. § 168 (describing the
methods used in determining depreciation deductions).
144. See id. § 469(c)(2).
145. See id. § 469(a), (d).
146. Taxation of capital gains began as a system wholly separate from income taxation
in 1965. In 1979, capital gain rates were integrated with the income tax system. It is clear
that, at least since 1979, capital gains have been considered income. See Capital Gains Tax
Act, 1979, ch. 14, §§ 1-3 (Eng.), reenacted Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, ch. 12
§§ 1, 2 (Eng.).
147. See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (including within taxable
income, each individual's "entire net income from all property owned and every business,
trade, or profession").
148. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 227, 232-33 (defining capital
gain).
149. See I.R.C. § 1211. In the United States, there is a small exception to the rule that
permits the deduction of a net capital loss up to $3000 per year for individuals. See id.
§ 1211(b). In the United Kingdom, losses are restricted because capital transactions are
subject to a separate tax regime that taxes net gains. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains
Act § 1.
150. Note, however, that indexing of one's expenditures (or basis) is allowed in the
United Kingdom for capital gains tax purposes. See Finance Act, 1982, ch. 39, § 86(1), (4)
(Eng.).
151. See I.R.C. § 1(h).
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be used only to offset income, not capital gains. Therefore, capital gains
will be taxed, at least, at the lowest rates.
The United States system first treats capital gains and allowable taxa-
ble losses as any other income. Then, any net capital gains may be totally
offset by the excess of deductions over income from other activities. De-
ductions for this calculation could include business and investment deduc-
tions, personal deductions such as residence mortgage interest and local
taxes, charitable contributions, and personal exemptions.
What constitutes a capital asset taxed under these provisions? Both
the American and British systems define capital assets as any form of
property.152 The principal exception under both tax systems concerns the
treatment of stock in trade.153 Though the United States definition of
capital asset excludes land or depreciable property used in a trade or
business,'54 United States law provides capital gains treatment for such
assets under a separate section. 155 Thus, both the British and American
capital gains systems, in their treatment of the disposition of assets associ-
ated with profit-making activities, often produce current income subject
to tax when held by the taxpayer. This characteristic of both systems cre-
ates two problems that affect the integrity of capital gains taxation.
First, a common problem is the transmutation of ordinary income into
capital gains, or capital losses into ordinary losses. In the United States,
the favorable tax rate for capital gains and the restricted deduction of
capital losses is the underlying cause of the transmutation problem. His-
torically in the United Kingdom, transmutation of ordinary income was
significant because capital gains were not taxed. Today, the distinction
between capital transactions and ordinary income is still significant due to
the British system's inclusion of indexing expenditure (or basis) for capi-
tal gain and loss purposes and the nondeductibility of net capital losses. 15 6
Treatment of the income from the sale of depreciable property demon-
strates how each system resolves one facet of the transmutation problem.
The sale may produce gain attributable to loss of expenditure (or basis)
due to depreciation deductions that have previously offset ordinary busi-
ness income. Such gain should not be a candidate for capital gains treat-
152. See id. § 1221; Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act § 21(1).
153. See I.R.C. § 1221(1); Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act § 161.
154. See I.R.C. § 1221(2).
155. See id. § 1231 (providing that when the combination of all transactions results in a
net gain, all transactions will be considered capital; when the combination results in a net
loss, all transactions will be considered non-capital, and losses will not be limited to gains).
156. In general, the United Kingdom does not tax gains attributable to inflation. An
allowance that reduces the amount of the chargeable gain is calculated based on a portion
of the cost of the asset. Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act §§ 53, 54. Capital losses created
by the allowance get limited relief. See Finance Act, 1994, ch. 9, § 93 (Eng.).
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ment, and both systems prevent such a result. In the United Kingdom,
gains realized to the extent of prior depreciation deductions become bal-
ancing charges that reduce depreciation allowances for that year.157 In
addition, the expenditure (or basis) that is indexed for capital gains pur-
poses does not include that portion that has been subject to capital al-
lowances (depreciation).
Generally, in the United States, gain realized to the extent of prior
depreciation is treated as ordinary income. 158 For non-real property,
such gain is completely recaptured as ordinary income.159 United States
law, however, is incomplete because gains from real property are only
recharacterized as ordinary income to the extent of the excess of acceler-
ated depreciation over straight line depreciation.16° Thus, in the case of
real property, substantial gains can be transmuted into capital gains. In
contrast, United Kingdom tax law does not even allow depreciation for
rental real property. 1'
Second, the problem of interest expenditures affects the integrity of
capital gains taxation. When asset acquisition is financed, interest be-
comes one cost factor in determining the overall profitability of an asset
in producing both current income and capital appreciation. When assets
produce insufficient current income, interest deductions can create cur-
rent losses offsetting other income.
Generally, in the United States, interest incurred pursuing profit-mak-
ing activities is deductible. As noted before, however, there are general
loss limitation sections that affect the deductibility of interest. First,
§ 163(d) restricts interest deductions incurred to acquire or carry financial
instruments, including stocks and bonds, to the amount of income such
capital assets produced. 162 As defined, income includes gains from the
sale of such assets, but only when the taxpayer elects to treat such gains
as ordinary income.' 63
Second, the passive loss rules work similarly in deferring net losses.
Any interest deduction would be fully allowable, at the latest, upon the
disposition of the activity for which it was incurred. Thus, the steeper the
differential between regular tax rates (presently 39.6% maximum) 64 and
157. See Capital Allowances Act, 1990, ch. 1, §§ 24, 26 (Eng.).
158. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(1), 1250(a).
159. See id. § 1245(a)(1), (3).
160. See id. § 1250(a)(1), (2), (3), (b)(1). Today, real property can only be depreciated
using a straight line method. See id. § 168(3).
161. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act §§ 38, 39, 53(2), (3) (failing to include rental
real property in depreciation provisions).
162. I.R.C. § 163(d).
163. See id. § 163(d)(4)(B)(ii), (iii).
164. See id. § 1.
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capital gains rates (presently 28% maximum), 65 the greater the incentive
is to finance investment assets.
Because the United Kingdom does not have preferential treatment for
capital gains, the system does not provide the same incentive to finance
capital assets as the American tax system. The British practice of indexa-
tion of capital assets, however, presents a different concern. If interest
incurred to carry assets is deductible, such interest deductions must also
be indexed if capital gains or losses are to be properly reflected.' 66
Unindexed interest encourages tax arbitrage.
Consider the following example that illustrates the effect that tax sav-
ings have on the viability of an investment that otherwise would break
even economically. Assume a taxpayer buys property for $100,000 fi-
nanced by a loan at 10% payable in one year. On the date of loan repay-
ment, the taxpayer sells the property for $110,000. Other than tax
consequences, the investment yields neither gain nor loss. Assume the
taxpayer is taxed at a rate of 40%, the approximate maximum United
States rate. The 28% rate for capital gains applies only in the United
States. The British indexing allowance, where applicable, is 5% this year.
The example presents various possibilities:
1. Without Indexing
U.S. tax U.K tax UK. tax
(int. ded.) (no int. ded.) (if int. ded.)
Interest
Deduction
(tax savings) 4000 0 4000
Capital
Gains Tax 2800 (28%) 4000 (40%) 4000 (40%)
Profit/Loss
After taxes 1200 [4000] 0
2. With Indexing
U.S. tax (no U.K. int. ded.) (if int. ded.)
Interest
Deduction
(tax savings) 4000 0 4000
165. See id. § 1(h).
166. See generally BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX (Henry
J. Aaron ed., 1976); DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM
(1977); INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXA-
TION 136-37 (1978) (discussing concerns regarding indexing interest) [hereinafter INSTI-
TUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES]; VITO TANZI, INFLATION AND THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX:
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1980).
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Capital 1400 (28% of
Gains Tax 5000) 2000 (40%) 2000 (40%)
Profit/Loss
After Taxes 2600 [2000] 2000
Example 2, column 2 represents the outcome in the United Kingdom.
Unlike interest under American law, interest is not freely deductible. Be-
cause of the limitations under British law, conversion of interest deduc-
tions into indexed capital gain is difficult, if not impossible. As
demonstrated earlier, interest is not freely deductible except for income
from trades or professions under Schedule D. If a trade acquires assets,
the assets are either stock in trade (non-capital) or property used in the
trade. In the latter category, if the assets are depreciable, there is no
indexing of depreciated expenditures. If the assets are not depreciable,
their use value is consumed in the business, presumably to make profits,
so that the interest expenditures relate to income chargeable under
Schedule D. Shares, unless stock in trade, are not taxed under Schedule
D. Thus, the segregation of assets prevents the translation of interest de-
ductions into indexed gains or losses, except for the possibility of non-
depreciable business assets.
Example 1 demonstrates the outcome under the United States system
and presents an obvious case for leveraging. Moreover, the American
system lacks the inherent safeguards found within the British system.
British taxing concepts cannot be introduced without fundamentally
changing the nature of the American system. A further incentive for
American taxpayers to leverage would exist if the American system
adopted indexation, since interest is freely deductible. Capital gains taxa-
tion would become a profitable area for tax arbitrage. Unindexed inter-
est deductions would be regularly exchanged for indexed capital gains,
turning economically unsound transactions into profitable after tax
activities.
II. REALIZATION, THE TAXABLE EVENT, AND CROSSING
SCHEDULAR LINES
A. Introduction
The timing of a transaction affects whether and when income is taxed.
Consequently, tax systems must be designed to recognize the impact of
timing. The concept of realization is critical to questions of timing and
plays a central role in both the British and American income tax systems.
Realization is an important concept both in the areas of capital gains
and losses, and in the timing of ordinary business (and other income)
receipts. The classic application of the doctrine occurs when economic
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gains (or losses) result from mere fluctuations in the market value of as-
sets the taxpayer owns.
Early economic theories of income clouded the issue of taxation of cap-
ital gains and losses. Under these theories, capital gains and losses were
excluded from income. Under a later economic theory of income, gains
and losses from transactions, or, classic realized capital gains and losses
were included in income. This later theory inspired the world's first sys-
tem of capital gains taxation in the United States.
Economic theory later expanded to include, as income, changes in the
market value of assets-a classic accretion concept of income. Simons
specifically rejects the notion that gain realization is necessary for taxa-
tion of capital gains and losses. Tax legal theory, however, rejects Simons
approach. Hence, taxable income, as distinguished from economic in-
come, does not include the mere appreciation or depreciation in value of
assets until such time as the gain or loss is realized at the sale or other
disposition of the asset.1
67
In the United Kingdom, Judge Rowlatt expressed this principle in
Royal Insurance Co. v. Stephen:16
8
At the bottom of this principle of waiting for a realization, I
think there is this idea: while an investment is going up or down
for Income Tax purposes the Company cannot take any notice
of fluctuations, but it has to take notice of them when all that
state of affairs comes to an end, when that investment is wound
up... [and] ceases to figure in the Company's affairs, when it is
known exactly what the holding of that investment has meant,
plus or minus to the Company, and then the Company starts so
far as that portion of its resources is concerned with a new in-
vestment. Then one knows where one is and it is no longer a
question of paper, it is a question of fact and that is a
realisation. 169
In Royal Insurance, realization occurred when the taxpayers had received
new shares of stock in exchange for old, pursuant to a government-or-
dered reorganization of certain companies. 170 The court recognized that
only the form of investment had changed, and admitted that the case
presented a close question.171 Ultimately, the court found that the reor-
167. But see I.R.C. § 1256 (taxing unrealized gain and loss on commodity futures and
contracts marked to market and creating an exception to the general rule that unrealized
gain or loss is not taxed).
168. 14 T.C. 22 (K.B. 1928).
169. Id. at 28.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 29.
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ganization had terminated the investment in the old stock and allowed
the taxpayer a loss deduction. 172
In the United States, the most famous explication of this principle is
found in Eisner v. Macomber,73 in which the Supreme Court held that a
proportionate common stock dividend on common stock shares was not
income.' 74 There, the underlying rationale was stated as follows:
Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capi-
tal, not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a
gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from
the property, severed from the capital however invested or em-
ployed, and coming in, being "derived," that is, received or
drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, bene-
fit and disposal; - that is income derived from property. 75
Thus, "enrichment through increase in value of capital investment is not
income in any proper meaning of the term."' 7 6 The importance of reali-
zation to the definition of income has been reiterated by the United
States Supreme Court time and again.' 77
Realization also has a role in the determination of ordinary income.
Tax accounting principles are wedded to the requirement of realiza-
172. See id.
173. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
174. See id. at 219.
175. Id. at 207.
176. Id. at 214-15.
177. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass'n. v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) (involving
the sale and purchase of mortgages); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,
430-32 (1995) (involving the classification of punitive damages as income).
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tion, 78 which can be illustrated by the accrual (U.S.) 17 9 or earnings
(U.K.) 8 ' methods of accounting.
The realization requirement is driven by the need for objective measur-
ability and by the uncertainty of income. When firms create products or
services for sale in the ordinary course of business, a continuous process
of creating or adding value exists. From an economic viewpoint, this pro-
cess is a continuous accession to income. An accretion concept of income
would require the measurement of the value of products or services con-
tinuously during, or at least as of the last day of, the taxable year. How
can one accurately measure that value? The choice of an arbitrary date
for measurement makes valuation extremely difficult and impractical.
Accrual accounting thus rejects accretion theory and adopts a realization
requirement. Put succinctly:
[T]he product or service can be measured best by the money or
money equivalent expected to be received for the product at
some time in the future. It is the uncertainty of this expected
receipt and the search for verifiable measurements that have led
accountants to the adoption of specific rules for the timing of
revenue.
18 1
178. See Willingale v. International Commercial Bank Ltd., 1978 App. Cas. 834, 838-39,
841 (appeal taken from C.A.) (noting that profit may be taxed when realized, namely when
it has been ascertained and earned); Ostime v. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd., [1961] 2 All E.R.
167, 170-71 (H.L.) (discussing realization principles in determining the appropriate ac-
counting methods for stock in trade and work in progress taxation).
The requirement of realization found in International Commercial Bank and Duple is
still the law today. There is a possibility that the requirement of realization may lose some
of its force in the determination of business profits because tax accounting under British
law is tightly wedded to financial accounting practice. Moreover, the holding of a recent
case suggested that financial accounting principles may control tax accounting. See Gal-
lagher v. Jones, 1994 Ch. 107, 134. Thus, tax accounting may change in accordance with
changes in financial accounting, and there is an indication that the realization requirement
may be changing for financial accounting purposes. See Judith Freedman, Defining Taxa-
ble Profit in a Changing Accounting Environment, 1995 BRIT. TAX REV. 434, 442 n.46.
Needless to say, the possibility that changes in financial accounting may control tax re-
sults, as the recent decision in Gallagher suggested, has sparked considerable debate and
criticism in the United Kingdom. See generally 1995 BRIT. TAX REV. 433 (presenting a
special issue exploring the relationship between accounting standards and taxable profits).
By contrast, in the United States, tax accounting is a well-developed field independent
from financial accounting. See, e.g., STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING
§ 1.01[4] (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the distinction between financial and tax accounting in
the United States).
179. See GERTZMAN, supra note 178, § 1.02[2] (describing the accrual method).
180. For an account of the earnings basis under British law, see generally Judith Freed-
man, Profit and Prophets-Law and Accountancy Practice on the Timing of Receipts-
Recognition Under the Earnings Basis (Schedule D, Cases I & II), 1987 BRIT. TAX REv. 61.
181. ELDON S. HENDRIKSEN, ACCOUNTING THEORY 181 (3d ed. 1977).
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Thus, accrual accounting requires the inclusion of income where the obli-
gation to be paid arises and the amount can be determined with reason-
able accuracy. In such a situation, "[t]he likelihood of collection is so
high in the normal business situation and collection so routine that com-
plete realization of revenue may be assumed."'"
The difficulty of accurate measurement makes determination of the
real income less certain. Realization also addresses another kind of un-
certainty: even if value is known at a particular point in time, that value is
transitory and taxation may result on income that will never be made real
in the conventional sense. For example, when a merchant keeps an item
instead of disposing of it, for whatever reason, the true economic measure
of income is not the item's present fair market value, but the present
discounted value of a future receipt for that item. Consider, for example,
a nursery business. "The present discounted value is difficult to deter-
mine because it depends upon expectations of future market prices and
the costs of harvesting and preparing the product for market.' ' 18 3 In
some instances, as with nursery stock or livestock, the product has an
ascertainable market price at each stage of growth.184 In these cases, val-
uation is simplified. 85 These measurements, however, while verifiable,
are but estimates of discounted net future values.' 86 The likelihood of
change in value adds uncertainty to any accurate determination of eco-
nomic income. Such uncertainty has been eliminated in a sale when the
taxpayer has fixed the maximum value by the expected receipt. 187
The same policy considerations apply to capital assets, but with poten-
tially greater force, because these assets are more likely to be held long
term. Another rationale often raised for the requirement of realization is
the taxpayer's lack of readily available funds to pay the tax if accretion in
value were taxed. Simply implying that the taxpayer could sell the prop-
182. Sidney Davidson, The Realization Concept, in MODERN ACCOUNTING THEORY 99,
107 (Morton Backer ed., 1966).




187. See id. Deductions do not seem to be governed by the same realization require-
ments. The tax system allows a deduction due to the expectation that an expenditure will
be used and quickly consumed to produce income. Under accrual accounting, a deduction
is allowed when the obligation to pay arises, even though the object of the expenditure
may still have utility in the business. The doctrine of capitalization (where the utility of an
expenditure is lengthy) and inventory accounting methods prevent deduction before reali-
zation. Realization occurs, for purposes of deduction, when the product or service created
is disposed of. In the case of capitalized expenditures for wasting assets, depreciation de-
ductions that are based on estimates of the decline in value may occur also before
realization.
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erty might be an unsatisfactory solution since some assets might be diffi-
cult to sell. Lack of liquidity of some assets is another rationale for the
concept of realization.
Thus, an important commentator, Marvin Chirelstein, speaks of the tax
system in the United States as a "tax on transactions,' 88 instead of a tax
on income-at least in the economic sense.' 89 Boris Bittker, another im-
portant commentator, states that, "The income tax depends on 'transac-
tions' or 'taxable events' and is not a tax on 'income' as defined by
economists."' 90 These general statements do not mean that the Ameri-
can system ignores economic income for some other theory of income.
Rather, the requirement of realization is generally understood as chang-
ing the timing of the reporting of economic income in the modern sense.
If realization changes only the timing of economic income, and not its
substance, then it follows that tax systems tax economic income that has
been crystallized by a transaction or other taxable event.
The following sections compare and contrast the different applications
of the concept of realization when taxpayers move assets between busi-
nesses, convert assets from business, to personal use, and conversely, con-
vert assets from personal to business use. If realization occurs in these
situations, economic gain will be reported. When assets are transferred
between trades or businesses, both the British and American systems
adopt a similar understanding of the doctrine. While the United King-
dom also applies this theory in other contexts, the United States does not.
As a result, in the case of conversions between business and personal use,
the United States system has developed a patchwork of different theories
directed at curing the problems that result from the absence of direct
taxation of these events.
B. Assets: Qualitative Change in Use
As previously noted, the paradigm for the application of realization is
capital appreciation. Both the British and American systems begin with
the notion that gain is not real unless it results from a market transaction.
Both systems, however, also face a myriad of situations that test their
abilities to fairly and consistently raise the revenues their governments
require. Faced with different situations, each system has taken a different
approach in defining realization. Analysis of the different approaches il-
luminates the nature, adequacy, and necessity of the concept of
realization.
188. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 72 (7th ed. 1994).
189. See id.
190. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 299 (8th ed. 1990).
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Turning away from capital assets and examining normal business trans-
actions reveals much about realization and taxation. Indeed, the United
Kingdom and the United States have provided us with two "chicken
cases" that challenge conventional wisdom.
In the British case, Watson Bros. v. Hornby,1 the taxpayers operated
businesses consisting of a chicken hatchery and brooder houses. 192 The
hatchery raised day-old chicks, most of which were sold in the normal
course of business. 193 However, some were retained to be raised in the
brooder houses, part of the farm's stock of birds.194
In contrast to the United States tax system, income from the two activi-
ties had to be reported on different Schedules. The parties eventually
agreed that the hatchery was deemed to be a business reporting its profits
under Schedule D, whereas the brooder activity was considered a farm
activity reporting its income under Schedule B.195 In addition, since the
activities were assessable under different Schedules, the parties agreed
that an adjustment of accounts was required for chicks "transferred"
from the hatchery to the brooder houses.196 The difficult question re-
volved around the basis on which the adjustment was to be made. 197
The facts showed that the cost per chick to the hatchery business was
seven pence.98 The brooder house could purchase chicks on the open
market for four pence per chick. 199 While recognizing that the hatchery
and the farm were two separate activities, Inland Revenue argued that a
person cannot trade with himself or suffer losses by transferring goods
from one division to another and concluded that the hatchery must be
credited with seven pence per chick, the cost of production.2 °°
Inland Revenue's position that realization cannot occur when one deals
with oneself has a certain intuitive appeal. And yet, the court rejected
Inland Revenue's case, finding instead for the taxpayers. While recogniz-
ing the usual truth of Inland Revenue's theory, the court concluded that
in this case it was "necessary to regard the hatchery and the farm as sepa-
191. 1942 All E.R. 506 (K.B.).
192. See id. at 506.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 506-07. This latter principle had been established in the United Kingdom
just before Watson Bros. was decided. See Long v. Belfield Poultry Prods., Ltd., 21 T.C.
221, 229-30 (K.B. 1937) (holding poultry farming activities to be assessable under Schedule
B and hatching under Schedule D). Schedule B is no longer part of British tax legislation.




200. See id. at 507; see also Sharkey v. Wernher, 1956 App. Cas. 58, 69 (appeal taken
from C.A.) (noting that a man "cannot trade with himself").
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rate entities. '20 1 Thus, a sale was deemed to have been made between
such entities at a reasonable or market price.2 °2
This result naturally followed from the fact that the schedular system
applies different schemes and rates to different kinds of income. Using
cost would have permitted an economic loss incurred by the hatchery to
be transferred to, and utilized by, the brooder house, thereby distorting
the true profit of the different enterprises.
The result entitled the taxpayer to an immediate tax loss. The taxpayer
also benefitted because the hatchery's trade losses could be set off against
income in general, while the losses attributable to the brooder house, a
farming activity, could not.20 3 Fundamentally, the loss in value of the
chicks was attributable to the period in time that the chicks belonged to
the hatchery business. It was therefore only fair that the taxpayer be en-
titled to the loss.
Yet, was this a realized loss? The court used the device of a notional
sale to determine the value of the transaction for tax purposes. 204 No-
tional, meaning imaginary, is the opposite of realization, which means
real or actual. While the sale was imaginary, the price was not. Similar
market transactions established the price. Realization, however, typically
requires a market transaction that confirms the reality of the actual trans-
action producing the loss. One of the major reasons for realization-the
problem of determining market values-was absent here. On the other
hand, the property's value was still subject to market forces and fluctua-
tions. Thus, when the taxpayer, as here, still retains the property after the
transaction has closed, the loss is not readily apparent.
Realization is often linked with the concept of a taxable event.
Whether we speak of income, or deductions in general, or losses, we are
searching for an event or events that render taxation appropriate. In
Watson Bros., the taxpayer experienced a taxable event as a result of the
transfer of chicks from the hatchery to the brooder house-in other
words, a transfer from one tax Schedule to another. Due to the nature of
the schedular system, these happenings could not be ignored.
The Watson Bros. interpretation of the requirement of realization in-
cludes the concept of deemed realization. At the hatchery, the normal
course was to sell the chicks at one-day old. Market value was easily
ascertained at that point. When a taxpayer reaches the point at which
there is an established market for an asset, and instead, chooses to devote
201. Watson Bros., 1942 All E.R. at 507.
202. See id. at 507-08.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
204. See Watson Bros., 1942 All E.R. at 508.
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that property to a different use, arguably a deemed disposition sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of realization has been made, especially when
the integrity of the schedular system would otherwise be compromised.
United States law also has a chicken case of similar significance. In
Burgess Poultry Market, Inc. v. United States,205 the taxpayer, a corpora-
tion, was engaged in the business of raising and processing poultry.2 °6
Prior to starting its farm operation, the taxpayer had purchased all the
requirements of its processing business on the open market.2 °7 After-
wards, its farm division produced broilers for its processing division, pro-
viding approximately forty percent of the processing division's total
intake.208
The issue before the court was whether the farm division's use of the
cash method of accounting clearly reflected the income of the taxpayer in
light of the processing division's use of the accrual method of account-
ing.20 9 The court determined that the taxpayer's actions were entirely
appropriate.210
The importance of this decision lay less in its holding than in its un-
stated commentary on United States tax law. The United States Treasury
authorizes taxpayers to use different accounting methods for trades or
businesses that are separate and distinct.21' The ability to treat the busi-
nesses independently for tax purposes is, however, somewhat elective due
to the Internal Revenue Service (Service) requirement that separate
books or records be kept for all trades or businesses desiring to be consid-
ered separate and distinct.21 2
Once two divisions of a single business are considered separate and
distinct for tax purposes, the question arises as to the proper treatment of
the movement of goods between them. Since each division maintains
separate books and records, the transfer of property from one business to
the other must be reflected. The potential problems and possible solu-
205. 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9515, at 93,163 (E.D. Tex. 1964).
206. See id. at 93,163.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 93,165.
209. See id. at 93,166.
210. See id.
211. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(d)(1) (1995). The question whether two activities of a
taxpayer are separate and distinct is a factual question. In a later poultry case, the Eighth
Circuit upheld a District Court finding that a hatchery division and broiler division were
"too interdependent and well-integrated" and lacked a "sufficient separation of books and
records" to be considered separate and distinct. Peterson Produce Co. v. United States,
313 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1963). In Peterson, the taxpayer was not permitted to use
separate accounting methods for the two divisions. See id.
212. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(d)(2).
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tions are thus the same as those faced by the British court in Watson
Bros.
The transfer might be considered merely a bookkeeping adjustment, so
that when inventory property is transferred, cost is removed from the
transferror's inventory and treated as an expenditure by the acquiring
business. If so, the property becomes a nullity for the first business be-
cause the original inclusion and later exclusion result in a wash. Since the
first business in Burgess Poultry was a cash basis taxpayer, upon transfer,
the taxpayer would be compelled to treat the original deducted costs as
income. The second business would continue as if it had originally ac-
quired the property at the taxpayer's original cost. Assuming the prop-
erty is inventory, the taxpayer's original cost would be included as a
purchase in calculating the cost of goods sold for the second business.213
From the perspective of a single taxpayer, simply shifting the original
cost from one business to another is obviously consistent with a view of
realization that, no gain or loss is realized when the property simply
moves to another pocket of the same taxpayer. Even though there are
two businesses, the general practice of United States tax law is to put all
of an individual taxpayer's activities together in one return, subject to one
tax. Unlike the situation in Watson Bros., where the integrity of the
schedular system was at stake, the only issue in Burgess Poultry was one
of timing.214 Remarkably, however, the court in Burgess Poultry did not
follow this logic.
Instead, the court in Burgess Poultry treated the events as notional
sales of the chicks by the farm division to the broiler processing division
at the prevailing market price at the time of transfer.215 The court based
this treatment on the actual conduct of the taxpayer, who handled all
transactions between the divisions as formal sales with invoices and trans-
fer payments by check.216
213. Simply put, inventory accounting determines income on the basis of two formulas:
gross income is determined by subtracting the cost of goods sold from gross sales; the cost
of goods sold is determined by adding opening inventory to purchases and then subtracting
closing inventory.
214. Certainly, U.S. tax law has adopted some features of the schedular system in order
to segregate certain activities of the taxpayer. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 469 (1994) (limiting losses
from passive activities to the amount of gain); id. § 465 (limiting deductions to the amount
at risk of loss for certain activities); id. § 902 (listing foreign tax credit rules); see also supra
text accompanying notes 61-93 (comparing the synthetic (U.S.) and schedular (U.K.) ap-
proaches to income taxation). Since these rules result in different taxation for different
activities, there is perhaps more at stake now under American law than at the time Burgess
Poultry was decided.
215. See Burgess Poultry, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 93,165.
216. See id.
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The courts in Watson Bros. and Burgess Poultry reached the same re-
suit. In both cases, the taxpayer advocated and established the position
that gains and losses that do not satisfy conventional notions of realiza-
tion should be deemed realized for tax purposes.
One might conclude, at least in Burgess Poultry, that the taxpayer ef-
fectively waived the claim of realization by treating the divisions sepa-
rately and electing different accounting methods. The government,
however, did not waive realization. In addition, if the Commissioner
makes the determination as to whether separate and distinct businesses in
fact exist, then it follows that he or she may require different accounting
methods in order to clearly reflect the income of each business.217 This,
then, weakens the argument that a taxpayer may waive the realization
claim by way of separate divisions and accounting methods. Even in
these latter cases, the principles of Burgess Poultry requiring a notional
sale should apply.
The consequences of these decisions profoundly affect our understand-
ing of the concept of realization. Under British law, the schedules sepa-
rate a taxpayer's activities into discreet components for tax purposes,
requiring notional sales in order to properly assess the profits of the activ-
ities. In the United States, accounting principles sometimes permit, or
even require, the taxpayer to treat different activities as separate busi-
nesses. When the focus is on the activity as a discrete business, the clear
reflection of income standard requires that the income of each business
be clearly reflected as an entity. It stands to reason that the income of
each separate business is clearly reflected only when it is credited with
the gains and losses incurred during the time it owned the property. This
would be determined on the basis of notional sales at fair market value.
Thus, deemed realization may exist when a taxpayer's activities are di-
vided up for tax purposes, and there is a need to clearly reflect the actual
income of each activity. How far this concept can, and is, extended under
British and American law will be seen in the next section. Ultimately, we
must address the question of whether deemed realization is realization or
its negation.
C. Redeployment of Property Between Business and Personal Use
Taxation has always recognized the distinction between business and
personal activities, and has paid considerable attention to keeping these
activities separate. When a taxpayer intentionally crosses the line sepa-
217. See Parker v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 331 (1961). In Parker, the Commissioner
successfully changed the accounting method of one of the taxpayer's businesses without
changing the other. See id. at 339.
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rating these activities by transferring property from one activity to an-
other, tax law must provide appropriate treatment. As we shall see,
British tax law has faced these problems directly and simply whereas
American tax law has employed many theories to deal with such transac-
tions. The role of realization is at the heart of the different approaches.
1. Conversion of Stock in Trade from Trade to Personal Use: The
British Experience
In viewing British law, we are incredibly fortunate to have an authori-
tative case that is both comprehensive in scope and detailed in explana-
tion. In Sharkey v. Wernher,218 the House of Lords considered the case
of a taxpayer, Lady Zia Wernher, who was engaged in several activities
with regard to thoroughbred racehorses.219 Lady Wernher was involved
in the activity of breeding horses, some of which she would later use to
race. 220 Some of these race horses would then be returned to the stud
farm for breeding.22'
The issue before the House of Lords was how to account for the trans-
fer of the horses from the stud farm to the racing establishment. Specifi-
cally, should the accounts of the stud farm be credited with the cost of
production or with the market value of the horses? 222 At issue was
whether the House of Lords would accept the principles of Watson Bros.
v. Hornby223 and apply them in this different context.
The situation in Sharkey differed from that in Watson Bros. due to an-
other peculiarity of the schedular system. The stud farm was a trade or
business taxable under Schedule D.2 24 The racing establishment, on the
other hand, was considered a recreational activity, free from taxation
under any schedule. 225 Though clearly the activity could produce income
or loss, such income or loss did not have a taxable source under British
tax law.22 6 Thus, unlike the court in Watson Bros., the House of Lords
had to deal with the conversion of stock in trade to personal use, not to a
different business use.
218. 1956 App. Cas. 58 (appeal taken from C.A.).
219. See id. at 59-60.
220. See id at 59.
221. See id.
222. See id at 61.
223. 1942 All E.R. 506 (K.B.); see supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Watson Bros.).
224. See Sharkey, 1956 App. Cas. at 59.
225. See id
226. See generally supra text accompanying notes 82-91 (discussing the effects of
schedular taxation).
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Viscount Simonds, the Chief Justice, spelled this out as follows:227
The problem, therefore, in all its simplicity, is whether a person,
carrying on the trade of farming or, I suppose, any other trade,
who disposes of part of his stock in trade not by way of sale in
the course of trade but for his own use, enjoyment, or recrea-
tion, must bring into his trading account for income tax purposes
the market value of that stock in trade at the time of such
disposition.228
Viscount Simonds also recognized the immense scope of this issue and its
importance in British law:
It is, as I have said, a surprising thing that this question should
remain in doubt. For unless, indeed, farming is a trade which in
this respect differs from other trades, the same problem arises
whether the owner of a stud farm diverts the produce of his
farm to his own enjoyment or a diamond merchant, neglecting
profitable sales, uses his choicest jewels for the adornment of his
wife, or a caterer provides lavish entertainment for a daughter's
wedding breakfast. Are the horses, the jewels, the cakes and ale
to be treated for the purpose of income tax as disposed of for
nothing or for their market value or for the cost of their
production?229
Adopting the principles of Watson Bros., the House of Lords con-
cluded that the conversion from business to personal use must be consid-
ered a disposition by way of trade.23° Furthermore, the House of Lords
treated the disposition as a notional sale at market value.231
The problem that the House of Lords faced in Sharkey began with an
unanticipated glitch in the tax system. The converted property was stock
in trade and an entry had been made in the taxpayer's inventory account.
Something had to be done because transfer of the item to personal use
without adjustment would have resulted in the cost of the property being
deducted as a cost of the items sold in trade.232
What makes Sharkey so clearly unique is the Lords' choice of the rem-
edy of a notional sale for value over a cost adjustment 233 in the year of
227. See supra note 67 (discussing the form of the modem English judgment).
228. Sharkey, 1956 App. Cas. at 68.
229. Id. at 69-70.
230. See id.
231. See id. The court noted by way of passing that in some cases an arbitrary or con-
ventional sum might be agreed upon. See id.
232. As discussed later, the American system also requires that an adjustment be made.
See infra Part IIC.2.
233. The taxpayer's solution was that cost simply should be added to sales. See
Sharkey, 1956 App. Cas. at 69.
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the conversion. The following comments by Viscount Simonds on this
issue should provoke serious thought:
An attempt has been made to justify the notional receipt of a
sum equal to the cost of production by treating such a receipt as
the equivalent of an expenditure which in the event proved not
to have been for the purpose of trade, since the article was not
disposed of in the way of trade. But this is pure fiction. Up to
the very moment of disposition (in this case the transfer of a
horse from stud farm to racing stable) the article was part of the
trader's stock in trade and the cost of its production was prop-
erly treated as part of his expenditure for income tax purposes.
I see no justification for an ex post facto adjustment of account
which in effect adds to a fictional receipt a false attribution of
expenditure.2 3 4
The policy underlying the decision was best expressed by the accompa-
nying opinion announced by Lord Radcliffe in his conclusionary remarks:
In a situation where everything is to some extent fictitious, I
think that we should prefer the third alternative of entering as a
receipt a figure equivalent to the current realizable value of the
stock item transferred. In other words, I think that the case of
Watson Bros. v. Hornby was rightly decided and that its princi-
ple is applicable to all those cases in which the income tax sys-
tem requires that part of a taxpayer's activities should be
isolated and treated as a self-contained trade. The realizable
value figure is neither more nor less "real" than the cost figure,
and in my opinion it is to be preferred, for two reasons. First, it
gives a fairer measure of assessable trading profit as between
one taxpayer and another, for it eliminates variations which are
due to no other cause than any one taxpayer's decision as to
what proportion of his total product he will supply to himself. A
formula which achieves this makes for a more equitable distri-
bution of the burden of tax, and is to be preferred on that ac-
count. Secondly, it seems to me better economics to credit the
trading owner with the current realizable value of any stock
which he has chosen to dispose of without commercial disposal
than to credit him with an amount equivalent to the accumu-
lated expenses in respect of that stock. In that sense, the
trader's choice is itself the receipt, in that he appropriates value
to himself or his donee direct instead of adopting the alternative
method of a commercial sale and subsequent appropriation of
the proceeds.235
234. Id.
235. Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted).
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2. Conversion of Stock in Trade from Business to Personal Use: The
American Experience
American law also recognizes the unique problems associated with the
conversion of stock in trade from business use to personal use. American
law does not, however, have a leading case that provides a comprehensive
approach to problems in this area. Instead, American law is revealed by
examining many authorities offering a patchwork of different theories
and approaches.
One should note the previous discussion outlining the various laws' ap-
proach to the "transfer" of stock in trade between businesses directly
owned by the same taxpayer. Under both the British and American sys-
tems, such an event is treated as a notional sale for value. Whereas Brit-
ish law follows this approach for conversions between personal and
business uses, American law does not. One might speculate that Ameri-
can courts simply missed the point of Burgess Poultry.2 36
The unstated starting point under American law is that realization is
absent where property is converted from business to personal use. Thus,
there is no true taxable event. The focus of the remedy is not on properly
reflecting business income, or properly taxing business income, but in-
stead on the propriety of business deductions. Thus, within this general
framework, there are many theories that inevitably lead to considerable
variation in approach.
Consider the conversion of stock in trade to personal use, which hap-
pens when the taxpayer appropriates the stock for his own personal use,
or makes a donative transfer in a non-business context. Initially, the Ser-
vice argued that the value of stock of a business, when converted to per-
sonal use, should be considered income to the owner-taxpayer. One of
the earliest cases raising this issue was Morris v. Commissioner,2 37 which
concerned the assessment of taxes during one of the first years of the
income tax law in the United States. In Morris, the court considered
whether the value of farm products that the owner consumed should be
considered as compensation for purposes of an otherwise allowable de-
duction for excess profit tax.238 The court rejected the Service's argu-
ment, concluding that the inescapable and incorrect result of the Service's
argument was that the value of the goods were income to the farmer:
236. See supra notes 205-16 and accompanying text (discussing Burgess Poultry).
237. 9 B.T.A. 1273 (1928).
238. See id. at 1277-78. If the taxpayer had invested capital in his business, he could
deduct an amount equal to his salary, or compensation for his services in the business, for
purposes of the excess profits tax. See id.
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To include the value of such products, even if it could be deter-
mined, in the deduction allowable for excess-profits-tax pur-
poses to a farmer as compensation would automatically subject
such amounts to normal tax and in effect include in income
something which Congress did not intend should be so regarded.
If products of a farm consumed thereon are income to the pro-
ducer, it would seem to follow that the rental value of the
farmer's home, the gratuitous services of his wife and children,
and the value of the power derived from draft animals owned by
the farmer and used without cost should also be so considered.
It is obvious that such items are comparable to the rental value
of a private residence, which has never been regarded as income
or as a factor in the determination of tax liability.239
The Service's theory slumbered until the 1940s when it placed renewed
hope in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Helvering v.
Horst,2 4 ° one of the leading cases in establishing the American doctrine
of assignment of income. Relying on Horst, the Service adopted the posi-
tion that the gratuitous transfer of business property, and hence its con-
version to non-business use, should result in the inclusion of the fair
market value of the property in the donor's income. 241 The Service's po-
sition applied both to personal gifts to individuals of business property
and charitable gifts of business property.
Nevertheless, cases quickly followed rejecting the Service's argument.
Farrier v. Commissioner242 dealt with a personal gift of cattle held for
business. 243 In SoRelle v. Commissioner,244 the Commissioner attempted
to tax the value of a mature wheat crop that had been conveyed as part of
an overall gift of land to the taxpayer-donor's children.245 Two cases also
raised this issue in the charitable donation context. White v. Brodrick246
considered a donation of wheat raised by the taxpayers.247 Campbell v.
Prothro24 s dealt with the donation of livestock (calves) to a charity.249
239. Id. at 1278. As can be seen, taxation herein might implicate imputed income-
something that has never been taxed in the United States.
240. 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940) (holding that the right to collect interest (on bonds re-
tained by the taxpayer) gratuitously transferred to his son was taxable to the father when
the son received the interest.
241. See I.T. 3910, 1948-1 C.B. 15.
242. 15 T.C. 277 (1950).
243. See id. at 283-84 (rejecting an application of Horst, finding no realized income).
244. 22 T.C. 459 (1954).
245. See id. at 475-76.
246. 104 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1952).
247. See id. at 214-15 (finding that in donating wheat, the taxpayer did not realize in-
come or gain).
248. 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954).
249. See id. at 332, 336 (finding the donation a gift and thus not subject to tax).
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These latter cases presented the additional wrinkle that, under United
States law, the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction of the fair market value
of the property donated to charitable organizations.250 Irrespective of
the context, the courts uniformly rejected the Service's arguments and
concluded that no taxable income.arose on the gift of property.25'
Though the courts were not particularly clear, there are two possible
theories for this result. The first is a common-sense view that there is no
gain when nothing is had in return. The Service's argument, similar to
that adopted in Sharkey, was that taxpayers do profit by giving the prop-
erty away. It argued, "The products of a farm are, from the beginning, in
the nature of income ... and it is believed that the satisfaction derived
from a contribution of such property to [a qdalified organization] results
in the enjoyment of income within the rule established in Helvering v.
Paul Horst R. G. ,,252 Similarly, a gift to a relative would result in enjoy-
ment of the income. An even stronger case for enjoyment of income
would result where no gift was made and the property was converted
from business to personal consumption.
The difficulty the Service faced was that it made a revolutionary argu-
ment in the context of a donative transfer, a transaction not generally
recognized as producing income. In the 1894 Act, United States tax law
flirted with the concept that the value of gifts was income to the recipi-
ent.253 Congress, however, quickly abandoned this approach in the 1913
Act by excluding the value of all gifts of property from income.254
The question before the courts was not whether the recipient of prop-
erty had income, but whether the donor had income upon the disposition
of the property by way of gift. Interestingly, the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) has no specific provision that deals with the tax effect of a gift on
the donor. The courts embraced the notion that one cannot have income
where one does not get anything tangible in exchange for one's property.
The courts simply would not accept the Service's view that generosity is
250. See id. at 333; White, 104 F. Supp. at 215.
251. See Prothro, 209 F.2d at 336; White, 104 F. Supp. at 215.
252. I.T. 3910, 1948-1 C.B. 15, 16.
253. See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 102 (1994)).
254. See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1-
9722 (1994)); see also supra note 61. Congress subsequently limited the scope of this exclu-
sion when it provided that the gifts and inheritances provisions did not apply to employer-
employee gifts. See I.R.C. § 102(c) (1994).
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its own reward capable of being valued. Key to their decision was the
conclusion that no income had been realized. 2"
It is instructive to examine traditional notions of realization as they
apply to the foregoing facts. First, there are no market transactions con-
firming the value of the property. In the case of charitable contributions,
however, market value must be found for purposes of allowing a deduc-
tion. Second, in the case of personal gifts and conversion to personal use,
the event does not produce the funds with which the tax can be paid. In
the case of charitable gifts, however, any possible income would be com-
pletely offset by the deduction. Third, the asset can change value and
thus the gain to the taxpayer is uncertain in the case of conversion to
personal use. With respect to gifts, however, the investment in the prop-
erty terminates for the donor, so that uncertainty has been removed.
After several losses, the Service abandoned its attempts to treat the
transaction as a notional sale for value. Still concerned with the potential
for tax abuse inherent in such transactions, the Service changed its strat-
egy and refocused its attention on the taxpayer's prior deductions with
regard to converted property. In Revenue Ruling 55-138,256 the Service
provided that gross income does not include the value of farm products,
manufactured products, or property held for sale in the ordinary course
of business that was donated to a charity.257 Instead, the Service ruled
that the taxpayer was required to remove the cost of these items from
inventory.258 Any deductions relating to these items not included in in-
ventory costs must also be recovered.259 In the case of expenditures
made in the year of the donation, costs were to be recovered by disallow-
ance of the deduction, or in the case of previous years' deductions, by
reducing the charitable contribution deduction by that amount.26°
Revenue Ruling 55-531261 provided a slightly different rule for the do-
nor in the case of a personal gift of business property. In the case of
personal gifts, any deductible expenses relating to the gifted property
arising in the year of transfer would not be allowed.262 Furthermore, to
the extent that prior years' expenditures associated with the gifted prop-
erty were included in inventory costs, then such costs had to be removed
255. See Prothro, 209 F.2d at 334-35. Interestingly, it was only one year later that the
House of Lords in Sharkey held that such a transfer did create a taxable event. See
Sharkey v. Wernher, 1956 App. Cas. 58, 69 (appeal taken from C.A.).
256. Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 C.B. 223.
257. See id. at 225-26.
258. See id. at 226.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. 1955-2 C.B. 520.
262. See id.
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from purchases for purposes of applying inventory accounting.263 Unlike
the case of a charitable contribution, however, any previously deducted
amounts relating to personally gifted property were left without
adjustment.264
Revenue Rulings 55-138 and 55-531 represented the Service's new po-
sition in reaction to its unsuccessful attempt to treat gifts of business
property as notional sales for fair market value. Rounding out the pic-
ture, we must also consider the Service's position on conversion of busi-
ness property to the personal use of the taxpayer. In the Internal
Revenue Manual, the Service instructs its revenue agents as follows: De-
termine if the owners consume or withdraw merchandise for personal
use, such as food, clothing, appliances, building materials, boats, motors,
etc. If so, proper reductions should be made to purchases or cost of
sales. 265 It is apparent that this approach leaves out adjustments for de-
ducted expenditures from prior years, and deductible expenditures made
during the year of conversion. Although the Manual ignores such ex-
penditures, the logic of Revenue Ruling 55-531 would suggest that other-
wise deductible amounts related to the converted property, incurred in
the year of conversion, would also be denied.
The scope of the Service's position outlined above is somewhat limited.
All statements deal with inventory accounted for under an inventory
method of accounting, with no indication that the doctrine extends be-
yond that kind of business property. In the United Kingdom, the princi-
ples of Sharkey apply to all kinds of trade assets and personal assets.266
Under American law, the question of whether goods must be ac-
counted for under an inventory method of accounting is critical under the
Service pronouncements. The cost of converted property is removed
from inventory, resulting in the disallowance of any deduction from busi-
ness income for those costs. If converted goods were included in inven-
tory, removing the costs of those goods from inventory substantially
limits any tax advantage derived from converting the property. If signifi-
cant indirect costs associated with such inventory were deducted in prior
years, however, an incentive to convert still exists. A few examples of
such significant costs are purchasing costs, handling costs, storage costs,
interest, and depreciation on equipment used to produce the property.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. STEVEN R. ROBERTSON & KARL M. ROBERTSON, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL,
30 (Practioners Ed. 1992).
266. There is, however, a limit to the scope of the British doctrine in the case of profes-
sions. See infra text accompanying notes 337-40.
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Under current United States law, some taxpayers are subject to the
§ 263A Uniform Capitalization Rules, which require that indirect costs
associated with produced property, or property purchased for resale, be
included in the cost of purchases for inventory accounting purposes.267
Thus, where the Uniform Capitalization Rules apply, the costs associated
with converted property will generally not be deductible. There are, how-
ever, some major exceptions to the reach of these rules. Section 263A
does not apply to property purchased for resale where the taxpayer's
gross receipts do not exceed ten million dollars.268 Section 263A does not
apply to the timber or ornamental tree business or to certain small farm-
ing operations.269 In addition, § 263A does not apply to many expenses
incurred in the development of oil and gas wells or other mineral prop-
erty.27° Thus, taxpayers not subject to the Uniform Capitalization Rules
may deduct substantial indirect costs associated with converted property
that will not be recaptured in later years.
In some cases, stock in trade of a taxpayer is also not subject to special
inventory accounting methods. For example, an inventory method is re-
quired where inventory is a material income producing feature of a busi-
ness.271 Businesses engaged in providing services are generally not
required to use inventories for goods sold to customers. Many farmers
are permitted to use cash basis accounting; indeed, even accrual basis
farmers do not have to inventory growing crops, trees, and plants.272
Thus, it is clear that there is a considerable gap in the treatment of stock
in trade where neither the Uniform Capitalization Rules, nor the Inven-
tory Accounting Rules, apply. The gap may be particularly wide in the
case of smaller business entities.
267. See I.R.C. § 263A (1994). Even when the property may not be subject to inven-
tory accounting rules, the indirect costs of self-produced property and property purchased
for resale must be capitalized when § 263A applies. See id. § 263A(a)(1)(B).
268. See id. § 263A(b)(2)(B).
269. See id. § 263A(c)(5) (stating that the provision does not apply to timber and orna-
mental trees produced by the taxpayer in a farming business); id. § 263A(d)(1)-(2) (stating
that the provision does not apply to a farming business involving animals or plants having a
preproductive period of two years or less, or to plants lost by reason of casualty, such as
freezing temperatures, disease, drought, or pests); see also id. § 447 (requiring certain cor-
porations engaged in the farming business to employ the accrual method of accounting).
270. See id. § 263A(c)(3).
271. See id. § 471; Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958) (requiring taxpayers to use an inventory
method of accounting where inventory is an income producing factor of the business). A
consequence of having to use an inventory method is that the taxpayer must use the ac-
crual method for the business in general, as opposed to the cash method. Inventory is
defined as stock in trade held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business.
272. See I.R.C. § 447(g); Rev. Rul. 79-102, 1979-1 C.B. 184.
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When an expenditure with respect to stock in trade is not reflected in
an inventory account because either the taxpayer was not required to use
inventories, or that particular expense was not required to be included as
a cost for inventory purposes, the consequences will depend on the par-
ticular situation. In Revenue Ruling 55-138, when the conversion was the
result of a charitable contribution of property, year of conversion expend-
itures not in inventory were denied and previous years' deductions re-
duced the amount of the current year's charitable deduction. In Revenue
Ruling 55-531, however, only current year expenditures were disallowed
in the case of personal gifts. Previous years' deductions were not
considered.
The Service never indicated the theoretical basis for its position, other
than to say that when goods are removed from a business, the cost of such
goods must be removed from inventory in order to counterbalance the
loss of revenue occasioned by the withdrawal of the asset. It is likely that
the justification for this approach probably lies in the Secretary's power
to insist that the taxpayer's accounting method "clearly reflect in-
come." 27 3 Income of the taxpayer would not be clearly reflected where
cost of goods sold (a reduction in arriving at gross income) determined at
the end of the taxable year after the conversion had taken place, included
a cost associated with property that was not "sold" or disposed of in the
course of the trade or business.
The Service's rule for expenditures that would be subject to rules of
deduction is based on two tenets of American tax law: (1) an expenditure
is not deductible unless it is for a profit-making activity; and (2) a deter-
mination to the contrary before the end of the taxable year requires that
an adjustment be made. Thus, even though the expenditure was for stock
in trade when made, at year end, we know that the expenditure was not
for stock in trade but for non-business purposes.
Turning to expenditures deducted in prior years, the Service ignored
these issues except in the case of charitable contributions. This was un-
derstandable for several reasons. First, one way of rectifying the problem
would have been to open the prior years, deny the deductions, and assess
deficiencies in tax. The Service, however, does not have the authority to
do so because the doctrine of the integrity of the taxable year permits
previous years to be opened for error only.274
A second approach would have been to counterbalance the previous
year's deductions by an equal amount of income assessed in the year the
273. I.R.C. § 446(b).
274. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364-67 (1931) (emphasizing the
familiarity and importance of the annual tax system).
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property was converted to non-business use. This, of course, is the
method prescribed by the tax benefit rule, which offsets the benefit of a
previous deduction by later inclusions in income.275 Until recent
times, 276 however, it was thought that the triggering event for the applica-
tion of the tax benefit rule was the recovery of an item for which a previ-
ous deduction was taken. Under conventional wisdom, in the case of a
gift or conversion to personal use, the taxpayer has neither received nor
recovered anything; therefore, the tax benefit doctrine's rule of inclusion
would not have applied.
In Revenue Ruling 55-138, the Service might have deemed the charita-
ble contribution deduction a recovery of sorts, because in that case the
charitable deduction was reduced for expenditures relating to the
donated property deducted in prior years. One might say that there was
a deemed recovery when the taxpayer enjoyed the value of the property,
for tax purposes, by disposing of it in such a manner as to enjoy a deduc-
tion for the fair market value of the property. 77 The Revenue Ruling
result is based instead, however, on the principle that a taxpayer should
not get a double benefit for the same item, that is, a deduction for a cost
of acquisition plus a deduction for the value donated.278 This conclusion
is not justified on the basis of the tax benefit rule because that rule is
founded on the principle that the previous deduction proves unwarranted
in hindsight.
Does the tax benefit rule apply to these situations, that is, to the dispo-
sition of stock in trade by personal gift or the conversion of stock in trade
to personal use? Modern principles indicate that it does.
275. See I.R.C. § 111; Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 401-02
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (applying the tax-benefit rule in a case involving recovered realty where the
taxpayer received full benefits from a charitable contribution deduction).
276. See infra text accompanying notes 278-305 (discussing Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983)).
277. The Service and the courts also have found a taxable event, or deemed realization,
in a situation where a teacher makes a charitable contribution of complementary copies of
books received from a publisher. See Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 224, 226 (7th Cir.
1975). The receipt of the books from the publisher is not an income-producing event, but
upon donation, the taxpayer has income to the extent of the fair market value of the books.
See id. This inclusion is equivalent to the amount of the charitable deduction, thus remov-
ing the tax benefit from such a contribution. See id. at 227; Rev. Rul. 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6
(providing that when a book reviewer, under the employment of a newspaper, receives
unsolicited books, donates such books to a charity, and takes a deduction, the fair market
value of the books is to be included in gross income).
278. The double benefit principle is also used to justify the view that the donation of
complementary copies of books and other items provides income. See supra note 277.
There the benefits were the noninclusion of the books in income in the year of receipt plus
the allowance of their fair market value as a charitable contribution where there had never
been a tax cost associated with the property.
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The tax benefit rule has been expressed as follows: "a recovery of an
item that has produced an income tax benefit in a prior year is to be
added to income in the year of recovery." 279 There are several aspects of
the rule that are important to emphasize. Traditionally, the rule arises
where the taxpayer appropriately takes a deduction for an item in a par-
ticular taxable period, and after the close of the period the taxpayer re-
covers the item that was the basis for the deduction. The conclusion upon
the recovery is that the previous deduction has proved to be "erroneous";
the Service, however, cannot go back to the year of the deduction and
correct the error because the deduction, when taken, was correct. The
doctrine of the "integrity of the taxable year" prevents the Service from
opening a previous year to correct an item that was correct at the time.28 °
The remedy is to include the recovered item in the current period up to
the extent of the previous deduction.
A recovery is important because it is the "taxable" event that triggers
the application of the tax benefit rule. It is also typically the taxpayer's
subsequent receipt of the item that illustrates the unreasonableness of
allowing the taxpayer to benefit from the prior deduction. The value of
the recovery can also limit the possible inclusion. It should be under-
stood, however, that the recovery is not income. Under traditional no-
tions, the tax benefit rule works in situations that would not normally
produce income because the taxpayer is simply getting back what was
once his, and, hence, represents a non-taxable return of capital. It is the
inconsistency of the prior deduction with the recovery that creates the
need for an income adjustment offsetting the prior deduction.
Thus, in most cases the amount of the previous deduction is simply
included in income, to the extent it produced an actual tax benefit.281
This is easily accomplished when a taxpayer receives a refund of state
income tax that had been deducted previously. The deduction is recap-
tured as income to the extent of the cash recovery. When the recovery is
of specific property, however, the fair market value at recovery may be
different than the fair market value at the time of the deduction. When
the value has increased, the prior deduction represents the appropriate
279. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 3 (1970).
280. The rationale was set forth in Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), affd
sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60, 63 (7th Cir. 1940):
Income tax liability must be determined for annual periods on the basis of facts
as they existed in each period. When recovery or some other event which is in-
consistent with what has been done in the past occurs, adjustment must be made
in reporting income for the year in which the change occurs.
Id. at 341.
281. See I.R.C. § 111 (1994).
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amount of inclusion.282 But when the property has decreased in value,
then the prior deduction is included only up to the amount of the current
fair market value.283
The United States Supreme Court dispelled the view that there must be
a recovery of a previously deducted item in order for the tax benefit rule
to apply in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner284 and its compan-
ion case, United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. 285 In Bliss Dairy, Inc., a com-
pany distributed cattle feed to shareholders in a corporate liquidation, the
cost of which had been deducted in a previous year.286 Though there was
realization, that is, the corporation exchanged property for its own stock,
the transaction was covered by a non-recognition provision of the Code,
§ 337.287 The Court concluded that § 337 did not preclude the application
of the tax benefit rule in this instance.288 Section 337 was still free to
work in its own particular way by leaving unrecognized the gain produced
on the exchange of the feed for stock.289 If treated as a fully taxable sale
or exchange, the gain would have equaled the "amount realized" or "fair
market value, 29° which would have equaled the fair market value of the
feed minus the basis of the feed, which would have been zero, because all
costs associated with the acquisition of the feed had been deducted
previously.
The Court concluded that an actual recovery was not required, finding
that "unless a nonrecognition provision of the Internal Revenue Code
prevents it, the tax benefit rule ordinarily applies to require the inclusion
of income when events occur that are fundamentally inconsistent with an
earlier deduction."'291 The Court stressed that the later events must be
"unforeseen at [the] time of the earlier deduction '292 and "fundamentally
282. See Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
283. See Rosen v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 226, 234 (1978), affd, 611 F.2d 942 (1st Cir.
1980). In Rosen, the taxpayer had taken a charitable contribution deduction in the amount
of $48,000, the fair market value of the property at that time. See id. at 228. When re-
turned in 1974, the property was worth only $25,000. See id. at 234. The taxpayer realized
the fair market value of the recovered asset as determined at the time of the recovery. See
Rosen v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d at 943.
284. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
285. See id. (reporting the decision included in Hillsboro).
286. See id. at 374.
287. See id. at 401-02; I.R.C. § 337 (1994) (providing that no gain or loss is recognized
for property distributed to a parent corporation from a complete liquidation of its
subsidiary).
288. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 402.
289. See id. at 401-02.
290. I.R.C. § 1001 (stating the process by which the amount realized from a sale or
exchange of property is determined).
291. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 372.
292. Id. at 383.
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inconsistent with the premise on which the [earlier] deduction was ini-
tially based."2 93 In other words, "[i]f that event had occurred within the
same taxable year, it would have foreclosed the deduction."294
The Court indicated that its understanding that a recovery was not nec-
essary was in accord with prior law.295 It principally relied on accrual
accounting concepts. Under accrual accounting principles, a taxpayer is
permitted to take a deduction when an obligation to make a payment
arises, even though the item is not actually paid at that time. When, in a
later tax year, it is determined that a taxpayer does not have to pay, ac-
cepted tax doctrine requires that the taxpayer take into income the
amount of the expense previously deducted.296 Since nothing is actually
received, the Court reasoned that this situation did not fit within the ordi-
nary definition of "recovery. 2 97 Accrual principles do not provide par-
ticularly strong support for the Court's ultimate conclusion, however.
Though there is no recovery in the sense of an actual inflow of an amount
that represents a previously deducted item, there is a clear recovery in the
accrual accounting sense. Under accrual principles, it is the fixing of the
obligation to pay, not the payment itself, that creates a taxable event, or a
deductible expenditure. If the creation of an obligation to an accrual tax-
payer is the same as an actual payment by a cash basis taxpayer, then the
termination of the obligation to pay for the accrual basis taxpayer is the
same as the actual return of the payment to the cash basis taxpayer.
Once the Court concluded that a recovery was not necessary, it illus-
trated its rationale by applying the results to a situation in which a tax-
payer had converted a business asset to personal use.298 The Court
considered the situation in which a taxpayer makes a rental payment on
December 15 for a business premises for a thirty day period. The pay-
ment is a current expenditure and deductible on the day made.299 On
January 1, the first day of the following taxable year, the taxpayer's family
moves in, thus converting the premises to personal use.3 ° ° The Court
concluded that this would be an event fundamentally inconsistent with
the business use upon which the deduction was based. 30 1 Therefore, the
293. Id.
294. Id. at 383-84.
295. See id. at 381-82.
296. See id.
297. Id. at 382.
298. See id. at 384-85.
299. See id.
300. See id. at 385.
301. See id.
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tax benefit rule would require the inclusion in the taxpayer's income of a
sum representing the amount paid for January.30 2
Here, there is no recovery and no realization in the classic sense. There
is no realization under American law of the value of the asset because the
taxpayer neither exchanges the asset nor receives anything of value.
When a taxpayer converts property to personal use, the Service may not
properly tax economic gain or loss, but must await an exchange for value.
The basis or tax cost of the item remains the same, and in the case of
expensed property the basis would be zero. Gain may be reported if the
taxpayer disposes of the asset in a taxable transaction.
The Court, however, had difficulty with this traditional outcome. If the
taxpayer may consume the value, the gain is not simply postponed, but
lost. In the case of the rental payment considered above, this clearly
would have been the result. In the United States, this result is inevitable
because the benefit derived from the consumption of the use value of
one's own property is not taxable income. This benefit is called imputed
income.3" 3 In the typical case of a taxpayer consuming his or her own
property, the taxpayer consumes his or her own capital (the purchase
price) as well as any potential gain, both in an economic sense and a tax
sense. This, though, is not the case where property is converted to per-
sonal use. Where a taxpayer previously deducted the cost of converted
property, the taxpayer is not consuming his or her own capital in a tax
sense, but only potential taxable income. Thus, as a practical resolution,
the Court's treatment of the previous deduction as income, under the tax
benefit rule, goes a long way toward putting the taxpayer in the position
he or she would have been in if he or she had originally purchased the
item for personal use. But this is not always the case. Deductible ex-
penses that were not part of the acquisition costs may not be recaptured.
Also, where the property has dropped in value while held by the taxpayer
for business purposes, the recaptured deduction will be included only to
the extent of the present fair market value of the property.304 Thus,
where a loss in value occurs during business ownership, that loss is al-
lowed for tax purposes. 0 5 Where a gain occurs during business owner-
ship, that gain is not realized and may be lost to the system through
302. See id.
303. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 188, at 23 (discussing imputed income).
304. This is the traditional rule. The logic of Hillsboro might indicate that the proper
outcome would be the full inclusion of the prior deduction because the tax benefit rule is
based on the assumption that any prior deduction has proven, in hindsight, to be
unwarranted.
305. Economic analysis would show that the loss should be allowed because it was in-
curred while the property was held for business. Full implementation of an economic anal-
ysis, however, requires full taxation, not simply the application of the tax benefit rule.
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taxpayer consumption. Application of the tax benefit rule to conversions
thus eliminates part, but not all, of the problem caused by conversion.
The application of Hillsboro presents vast unknowns. The Court cau-
tioned that it was not deciding whether the tax benefit rule applied where
expensed assets were disposed of by gift or devise.3 °6 Since both gift and
devise situations present the same problems as simple conversions to per-
sonal use, that is, the problem of previously expensed assets escaping tax-
ation, the tax benefit rule should apply. A gift or devise of business
property is certainly inconsistent with the purpose for which the property
was acquired.
A second unknown deals with how far this doctrine will extend to prior
deductions. Hillsboro spoke of the application of the doctrine to the di-
rect costs of both tangible (cattle feed) and intangible (prepaid rent) as-
sets. What about indirect costs and carrying charges?
The United States Tax Court has found that there is a limitation. In
Rojas v. Commissioner,0 7 the Service sought the inclusion of previously
deducted expenses for materials and supplies that had been expended to
produce crops distributed to shareholders pursuant to a corporate liqui-
dation.30 8 The court concluded that the deductions could not be recap-
tured because they had in fact been consumed in the business, even
though the crops they produced were not.3 9 This view, in essence, would
preclude the application of the tax benefit rule to the direct costs of self-
produced assets. Fortunately, most self-produced assets, except in farm-
ing activities, would normally be treated under an inventory method of
accounting subject to the Uniform Capitalization Rules, which makes the
operation of the tax benefit rule largely superfluous. The logic of Rojas
also indicates that the tax benefit rule does not apply to indirect costs.
Moreover, Rojas dealt with expenditures that had been deducted (or
were being deducted) in the year of conversion. The result calls into
question the provisions of Revenue Ruling 55-531,31° which denies a cur-
rent deduction in a case where farm animals or produce were converted
by way of personal gift. There the Service ruled that, "If, for example,
the products or goods were grown or manufactured in the year of the gift,
such cost applicable thereto should be disallowed. ' '311
306. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 386 n.20.
307. 90 T.C. 1090 (1988), affd, 901 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1990).
308. See id. at 1091-92.
309. See id. at 1109.
310. Rev. Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 C.B. 520, modified, Rev. Rul. 75-11, 1975-1 C.B. 27.
311. Id. at 522.
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3. Depreciable or Wasting Assets
When dealing with the conversion of depreciable property used in a
trade or business to a nonbusiness use, British and American law provide
their most polar results. Consistent with the principles of Sharkey v.
Wernher,312 British law treats the taxpayer as having made a notional sale
at an open market price in the course of trade. Instead of recognizing the
gain, British legislation requires a balancing charge, in which depreciation
deductions for the year are reduced by the amount of the gain. The
consistent and logical outcome under the Taxation of Chargeable Gains
Act is that a person who has taken a depreciable asset out of trade is
treated as having been paid the open market price.314 Thus, British law
continues to follow the principle that, regardless of whether the notional
sale of the asset produces gain or loss, the business accounts must reflect
the actual economic result that occurred during the time the business held
the asset.
American law has a narrower objective. The primary purpose of the
statutory depreciation recapture rules is to ensure that the gain from the
disposition of depreciable assets is ordinary income, not capital gain, to
the extent that such gain represents prior depreciation deductions.315
This is necessary in the United States because capital gains and losses are
one facet of the overall income tax scheme, and depreciable business
property is otherwise treated much like a capital asset under § 1231.316
The recapture rules also contain provisions suspending the operation of
certain nonrecognition rules.317 The Code, however, specifically excludes
dispositions by way of gift or devise from depreciation recapture.31 As
noted before, gifts and devises are not considered taxable dispositions
under American law due to questions of gain and realization, not nonrec-
312. 1956 App. Cas. 58 (appeal taken from C.A.).
313. See Capital Allowances Act, 1990, ch. 1, §§ 4, 24-26 (Eng.).
314. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, ch. 12, § 17 (Eng.).
315. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1) (1994) (classifying "[glain from dispositions of certain de-
preciable property" as generally ordinary income); id. § 1250(a)(1) (including "[glain from
dispositions of certain depreciable realty" as generally ordinary income). For real prop-
erty, recapture applies only to the excess of accelerated depreciation over straight line.
See, e.g., id. § 1250(b)(1).
316. See id. § 1231 (addressing gains and losses in the context of property in a trade or
business and also involuntary conversions).
317. See id. §§ 1245(a), 1250(a). Under general principles of U.S. tax law, all realized
gains are recognized (included in income) unless a specific nonrecognition section of the
Code provides otherwise. See id. § 1001(c) (providing that "[elxcept as otherwise provided
[in the code], the entire amount of the gain or loss ... on the sale or exchange of property
shall be recognized").
318. See id. §§ 1245(b)(1), (2), 1250(d)(1),(2).
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ognition.319 Conversions to personal use are not specifically mentioned
in those sections, most likely because such changes in use have never
been considered a disposition.
4. Change of Purpose: Personal to Business
What happens to a taxpayer who converts a personal use asset to busi-
ness use? For example, a taxpayer purchased an automobile for personal
use. Years later, she decides to devote this automobile exclusively to a
business purpose. Uniformly, whether we consider British or American
tax law, deductions are not allowed for maintenance, repair, or deprecia-
tion of assets devoted to personal use. When an asset is a wasting asset,
there is a good chance that its value will have decreased since the time it
was originally acquired for personal use. This lost value represents value
that has been consumed through personal use. Neither the United King-
dom nor the United States system allows a deduction for a loss on the
disposition of a personal use asset. Where there is conversion of a per-
sonal use asset to trade or business use, there is no actual disposition.
Thus, such a conversion presents the possibility that the taxpayer could
use the original cost of the asset for business purposes, thus taking deduc-
tions for amounts that actually represent personal consumption. Both
systems prevent this possibility, but by quite different devices.
a. The United Kingdom: Personal to Trade
Sharkey v. Wernher32 is known for the well-recognized principle of
British tax law that the conversion of stock in trade to personal use is a
taxable event treated as a disposition for value. Viscount Simonds's com-
ments on the proper treatment of conversions of property from personal
use to use in a trade are an equally important facet of this case. Viscount
Simonds concluded that the general principles of Sharkey apply to this
transfer as well:
In the same way, it would, I suppose, be claimed that, if Lady
[Wernher] were to transfer or re-transfer a horse from her rac-
ing establishment to her stud farm, some figure would have to
appear in the stud farm accounts in respect of that horse, though
it cost her nothing to make the transfer: if it were not so and she
subsequently sold the transferred horse and the proceeds of sale
were treated as receipts of the stud farm, she could justly com-
plain that she had been charged with a fictitious profit.321
319. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
320. 1956 App. Cas. 58 (appeal taken from C.A.).
321. Id. at 72.
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Thus, the transfer of a horse from a racing activity (considered personal
in the United Kingdom) to a stud farm (considered a trade) creates a
taxable event that also should be treated as a notional sale at market
value. Such treatment is entirely consistent with the holding of the case.
Although Lady Wernher lost the case, the overall implications were prob-
ably beneficial to her, because any gain or loss due to the disposition of
personal use property would have been capital. For most of its history,
the United Kingdom did not tax income from the sale of capital assets.
Thus, any appreciation in value of the horses due to their successful rac-
ing careers would have escaped taxation. Any loss, of course, would also
have been ignored. Both the dicta and holding of Sharkey require that
transfer of assets from personal to business use be treated as a sale at
open market value. Thus, a taxable event is once again created. Under
the facts of Sharkey, however, any gain or loss would now be subject to
the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, not the normal income tax.
As noted previously, the capital gains provisions today treat capital
gains as ordinary income under most circumstances.322 There are, how-
ever, some major exclusions. Any gains derived from the sale of wasting
assets, defined as those assets with a predictable life not exceeding fifty
years, 323 are exempt from tax in the United Kingdom.32 4 Horses would
certainly qualify for this exclusion. Any loss derived from the sale of
wasting assets would be denied also.325 To complete the picture, if the
asset were not a wasting asset, the capital gains provisions also have a
general chattel exemption that exempts the gain from the sale when the
total consideration does not exceed six thousand pounds.
326
The rationale for the tax exemption for wasting assets appears to be
that wasting personal use assets typically decline in value, so that gain
rarely would be produced.32 7 Obviously, not all personal use assets, such
as race horses, would decline in value, resulting in some large capital
gains escaping taxation under this rule. Since Lady Wernher's stud farm
appropriated the animals with a notional market value purchase price,
322. See supra notes 148-67 and accompanying text (comparing the treatment of capital
gains and losses under the English and American systems).
323. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, ch. 12, § 44 (Eng.).
324. See id. § 45. This exclusion does not apply to business assets that have been used
as such since the beginning of ownership to the assets' disposal. See id. § 47.
325. See id. § 16(2) (providing that losses are not allowed to the extent that gains from
the same transactions would not have been taxed).
326. See id. § 262(1). For sales at total consideration greater than £6000, the Act con-
tains a phaseout provision. See id. § 262(2), (5).
327. Under British tax principles, real properties used as residences are not wasting
assets. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act § 44(1)(a).
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the stud farm would have been able to deduct that cost over the useful
life of the animal.3 28
When the asset involved is not a wasting asset, the disposition is typi-
cally subject to taxation under the capital gains provisions. When an as-
set is converted to stock in trade, § 161 specifically defines the transaction
as a notional sale at market value.329 Subsection (3) of § 161 allows the
taxpayer to escape capital gains tax consequences in this context in two
ways: (1) by reducing market value cost for purposes of the trade by the
amount of the chargeable gain; or (2) by increasing market value cost for
purposes of the trade by the amount of the allowable loss.330
Echoing the words of Lord Radcliff, this method presents a fairer mea-
sure of taxation than the other methods suggested to the Court.331 It
ensures that the trade takes into consideration the actual profit or loss
experienced after conversion to business use. It also ensures that the ap-
preciation in value (or gain) or depreciation in value (or loss) that the
taxpayer actually experienced while holding (and using) the property for
personal pursuits is taken into consideration as the particular system
mandates. Lastly, the method ensures that the profits of the stud farm
properly reflect the actual costs it incurred in making a profit. It is the
horse's value, which has been determined in a taxable event, that is used
or consumed by the trade in making a profit.
The provisions do allow for the distinct possibility that the business
taxpayer will be able to write off amounts that represent untaxed gain.
This, however, is an explicit feature of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains
Act that allows, in certain circumstances, a gain on the sale of property to
escape taxation.
b. The United States: Personal to Profit-Making
The taxpayer's change of use of property under American law, in this
case from personal to business, is not a taxable disposition.332 If it were,
gain would be taxed, subject to the application of special rates for some
328. See CCH British Tax Reporter, 358-650 (1989).
329. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act § 161 (1).
330. See id. § 161(3).
331. See Sharkey v. Wernher, 1956 App. Cas. 58, 84-85 (appeal taken from C.A.) (Lord
Radcliff, J., concurring).
332. The following discussion applies to all profit-making activities, including trades
and businesses (or professions), investments, and employment.
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capital gains;333 losses would not be allowed since losses are generally not
allowed on the disposition of personal use property.334
Since there is no sale or other disposition, American law must deal with
this situation in another manner. Instead of dealing with all possibilities,
American law focuses on a particular abuse caused by the conversion.
This abuse occurs when the property has lost value during personal use,
as when the property's fair market value is less than the property's cost or
"adjusted basis." American law prevents this economic personal loss
from being deducted as a business loss by a rule that limits the taxpayer's
adjusted basis to the fair market value of the property at the time of the
conversion for purposes of loss deductions and depreciation only. 335 This
special rule does not affect a later disposition at a profit; thus, the tax-
payer must keep two basis accounts, one for purposes of sale at a gain
and one for purposes of deductible loss and depreciation.
American law ignores the case in which property has increased in value
over basis during the time of personal use. The economic gain is simply
deferred. Cost or basis for purposes of the business remains the tax-
payer's historic cost, not the increased fair market value at the time of the
conversion. There is a trade-off between immediate recognition of gain
(and revenue to the government) and lesser business deductions caused
by the failure of the cost or basis for the business to increase to fair mar-
ket value. This introduces a trade-off which may counter deferral: the
non-taxation of capital gains at a maximum rate versus the disallowance
of future ordinary business deductions at the taxpayer's highest marginal
rate.
5. Sharkey v. Wernher Limited
One British court has ruled that the principles of Sharkey v. Wernher336
do not apply in the case of a taxpayer, in a profession, who disposed of
self-created property. In Mason v. Innes,33 7 Judge Goff ruled that no no-
333. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (1994) (discussing maximum capital gains rate).
334. See id. § 165(a), (c)(1), (2) (limiting deductions for losses to losses incurred in
trade or business, or transactions engaged in for profit). Certain casualty losses to personal
use property are allowed. See id. § 165(c)(3).
335. See Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U.S. 582, 586 (1928) (analogizing to gifts of devise and
finding the true fair market value "at the time when the transaction for profit was entered
into may be taken as the basis for computing the loss"); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165-
9(b)(2), 1.167(g)-i (1995). The theory of the case is that losses are allowed only when
incurred in a "transaction entered into for profit." I.R.C. § 165(c)(2); see Tindle, 276 U.S.
at 585 (interpreting the phrase broadly). Personal losses are not allowed. See I.R.C.
§ 262(a).
336. 1956 App. Cas. 58 (appeal taken from C.A.).
337. 1967 1 Ch. 436, aff'd, 1967 Ch. 1079 (Ch. App.).
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tional sale for value existed when an author gave his unpublished novel to
his father.33 s The taxpayer was in a profession, and had previously de-
ducted costs associated with writing the novel. 339
Judge Goff's decision rested on the assumption that the novel essen-
tially represented the taxpayer's services. Taxing in this instance would
lead to the following anomalous result:
[C]arried to its logical conclusion the principle, if applied to pro-
fessional men, must mean that they cannot give their services
within the ambit of their profession without, in some cases at
least, becoming liable to income tax on notional fees, which in
my judgment is a reductio ad absurdum.340
Certainly, the British system is not alone in its reticence to becoming
involved with the transfer of services within the family. Consumption of
one's own services, a form of imputed income, has not been the subject
matter of tax. The gift of one's services is analogous to self-consumption;
that is, instead of providing such services in a market transaction and get-
ting paid for them, the taxpayer chooses to forego a cash benefit for the
personal satisfaction of conferring a benefit on another. Neither system
has found that this is a particularly proper or practical area for taxation.
Based on the fact that Innes, though not a decision of the House of
Lords, has remained unchallenged for almost thirty years, it would be
safe to conclude that British law is settled on the point that there are no
tax consequences. Under American law, the tax benefit rule, as formu-
lated in Hillsboro, might apply to include the previous deductions as in-
come. Hillsboro, however, has not been used in this manner thus far.
The situation is analogous to employees who use facilities or supplies to
perform personal services for themselves. While the employers would
normally receive a deduction, and the employees would be receiving eco-
nomic benefits, these benefits are typically excluded from income as de
minimus fringe benefits. 34 1 Hillsboro, therefore, may simply not apply,
even though deductions have been taken for expenses, which now, in
hindsight, are proven to be related to a personal activity.
Classic imputed income doctrine is a satisfactory approach when deal-
ing with the transfer en famille of consumable services. Typically, these
services are rendered in a situation other than the professional capacity of
the donor. Consequently, there may not be a ready market or easily as-
338. See id. at 437-38, 448-49.
339. See id. at 437-38.
340. Id. at 448.
341. See I.R.C. § 132(e) (1994) (excluding from the employee's income the value of
property or services that is "so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or adminis-
tratively impracticable").
19961
Catholic University Law Review
certainable value for them. Deductions, moreover, would not have been
taken by the donor. Imputed income doctrine is inappropriate, however,
when substantial deductions have been taken, or when the service be-
comes a property interest capable of being sold by the donee for value.
The tax system is wronged, at the least, in letting stand the deductions
incurred by the donor in creating the property. The system is doubly
wronged when the property is given away and the economic income is
taxed to another.
From an American perspective, the real issue suggested by Innes is the
application of the assignment of income doctrine. Income earned by the
donor is received by the donee; should it not be taxed to the donor? A
finding of a notional sale for market value would have taxed the donor
fairly on the income generated in his profession at the time of the gift.
This result would obviate the need to resort to the assignment of income
doctrine.
The American assignment of income doctrine does not apply to the
facts of this case. The doctrine is divided into two parts, one dealing with
service income and one with property income. Self-created property is
treated as property income. When a donative transfer of the entire prop-
erty (corpus and income) is made, the new owner of the property is typi-
cally taxed on the income. 342 An exception exists when the donee cannot
affect the amount of income the property earns. In that case, the income
is taxed to the one who transferred the property.3' 3 Of some amusement
is the fact that, in the United States, disposition of the novel by the au-
thor to his father is not covered by principles applicable to assignment of
service income, which would tax the donor, because tax law treats the
novel as property. In the United Kingdom, however, the transfer of the
novel is not treated as a notional sale of property because it is treated as a
transfer of services.
D. Transfer Pricing and Realization
In both nations, modern doctrines regarding dealings between related
entities have been designed to cure what legislatures have concluded to
be serious abuses of the tax system. An examination of the function of
these doctrines may elucidate the most critical aspects of the doctrine of
realization.
342. See Heim v. Fitzpatrick, 262 F.2d 887, 890 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that the taxpayer
did not retain sufficient control over property assigned by him to family members to justify
treating him as the owner for tax purposes).
343. See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 123-24 (1940).
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The statutes of both the United Kingdom and the United States re-
spond to the situation when related parties are not dealing with each
other at arm's length. British law is the narrower of the two. It addresses
only sales of property,344 and requires that the participants be "bod[ies]
of persons., 345 Further, it applies only to buyers who are residents when
the actual price is greater than an arm's-length price,346 and to sellers
who are residents when the actual price is less than an arm's-length
price. 347
American law, on the other hand, is broader in its coverage, dealing
with both domestic and international situations.348 American law covers
all dealings, not just those involving property. Persons affected include
"organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated). 349
Section 482 grants the Service the power to allocate income and deduc-
tions among affected persons when such power "is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income, 35 ° of such per-
sons. Both nations' provisions adopt the arm's-length standard.351
The most typical situation covered by transfer pricing legislation con-
cerns transactions between affiliated corporations. Consider transfers of
property between such corporations. From the point of view of the total
economic enterprise, the firm, nothing of substance has happened. There
has been no disposition, no ending of the interest in the property, no true
sale.352 Yet, for most purposes,353 transactions between affiliated corpo-
rations are treated as transactions between strangers. Indeed, transfer
344. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 770(1) (Eng.). The proce-
dure also applies to leases and transfers of intangibles in the same manner as it does to
sales. See id. § 773(4).
345. Id. § 770(1).
346. See id. § 770(1), (2)(a).
347. See id. § 770(1), (2)(b).
348. See I.R.C. § 482 (1994). In practice, because invocation of § 482 is in the discretion
of the Commissioner, the transfer pricing doctrine is utilized only to protect the United
States tax base.
349. Id. One court has found that § 482 is applicable to an individual in the entertain-
ment business and his wholly-owned corporate chicken business. See Borge v. Commis-
sioner, 405 F.2d 673, 678 (2d Cir. 1968).
350. I.R.C. § 482.
351. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, § 770(1)(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1)
(1996).
352. See William B. Barker, Federal Income Taxation and Captive Insurance, 6 VA. TAX
REv. 267, 299-300 (1986).
353. One exception to this in the United States is insurance contracts between one par-
ent company and its own captive insurance company. See, e.g., Malone & Hyde, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 62 F.3d 835, 840 (6th Cir. 1995); Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct.
555 (1985); see also Barker, supra note 352, at 267.
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pricing rules exist to ensure that related entities conduct themselves as if
they were strangers.
Is realization present where goods are transferred at a price other than
at arm's length? First, there is no market transfer that confirms the in-
come. The selling corporation, when it has sold the goods for less than
fair market value, does not receive the cash (representing some of the
income) to pay the tax. Additionally, when one considers the difficulty
often faced by government and taxpayer alike in establishing an arm's-
length price, one can safely conclude that even when dealing with stock in
trade, value can be difficult to determine. The gain or loss is also transi-
tory when one focuses on the firm.
Tax law, of course, does not focus on the firm but on the individual
corporate enterprises, which are separate taxpayers. Tax law in this area
begins its analysis at a different point than economics. Thus, dealings
among members of the same economic group represent, for tax purposes,
real dispositions, real terminations of the corporation's investment, and
real sales. From an economic point of view, these transactions are less
real than gifts, and are no more real than the other transfers to or from
trade discussed above. From a tax position, they are taxable dispositions
for value.
The scope of § 482 is not limited, however, to corporate bodies. The
statute covers unincorporated "organizations, trades, or businesses.
3 54
The section can apply to dealings between separate and distinct busi-
nesses of the same taxpayer like those found in the case of Burgess Poul-
try.3  The tax construct of separate corporate entities that results in
realization in the inter-company setting under § 482 is absent in these
situations.
Moreover, principles parallel to transfer pricing doctrine apply as well
to intra-business or intra-company dealings with international compo-
nents under American law. Section 863(b),35 6 and regulations there-
under, 357 require the apportionment or allocation of income (and deduc-
tions) for certain cross-border activities between United States source
and foreign source income.358 This is required to ensure that foreign
source income is appropriately calculated for purposes of the limitation
on the foreign tax credit. 359 Thus, the equivalent of a deemed realization
354. See I.R.C. § 482.
355. See supra note 349. For a discussion of Burgess Poultry, see notes 205-17.
356. See I.R.C. § 863(b).
357. See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(f)(3) (1977).
358. See id. § 1.861-8(f)(3)(A)-(C) (transportation, manufactured goods, and sales of
personal property).
359. See id. § 1.861-8(f)(1)(i).
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is adopted under American law for purposes of sourcing, though not for
purposes of timing, of certain international intra-business activities.
E. Realization: Conflicting Doctrines and a Proposed Solution
Reflecting on the quite different approaches to the conversion or
change of use of assets under the British and American systems, it is nec-
essary to reiterate the surprising proposition that both systems consider
the principle of realization a critical element in defining income. While
the two countries have reached dramatically different results, it should be
noted that the British decision was a difficult one. Indeed, it was on a
knife's edge and, though it might not have been known to the drafters of
the decisions, they were considering many of the same issues and impor-
tant arguments raised in the United States. Is the conclusion to be
reached from this comparison that realization is merely an arbitrary con-
dition that takes its content from the character and policy objectives of a
particular tax system? Or does the concept of realization in the definition
of income contain core critical elements generally applicable to any in-
come tax system?
Though both expressions provide some insight, the comparative analy-
sis undertaken herein supports the conclusion that realization has prag-
matic elements important to the definition of income for tax purposes.
Moreover, critical assessment of each system's approach illuminates some
of that essence. This analysis concludes that the British approach focuses
directly on the critical core of this concept and is, in fact, the superior
political tool for fair and common sense taxation.
Reconsider modem economic theory's rejection of realization as a
component of the definition of economic income. If given a choice as to
the best base for assessment, an assessment based on the lifetime earn-
ings of a taxpayer would prevail. In such a case, the precise timing of
income would be irrelevant. The results of transactions during life would
be recorded as realized since that event would present the best evidence.
Ultimately, the debate between accretion and realization-based systems
would be irrelevant. Remaining assets would be valued at death, and the
concerns of realization would generally be met because the taxpayer's
investment would truly be at an end.3 60
360. First, gain or loss is no longer transitory to the decedent because his relation to the
property is at an end. Second, property is typically valued at death for inheritance pur-
poses and errors in valuation would be reflected in the recipient's tax cost or other basis.
Third, the unfairness perceived when taxing unrealized appreciation due to the possibility
that the taxpayer would not have independent funds to pay the tax and might be required
to sell the property does not apply here because the taxpayer, at death, transfers the prop-
erty in any event.
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The inherent difficulty of tax policy is that it does not tax lifetime in-
come, but the results of particular taxable years segmentally. The major
purpose of tax law is to collect revenue, whereas the foci of economic
analysis are different. Thus, tax law must allocate results to particular
time periods. The concept of realization has been important in accom-
plishing that goal. 361 But what are the necessary attributes of this
doctrine?
Realization, as an American tax concept, generally requires that in-
come be made real or confirmed by a market transaction between sepa-
rate taxpayers.362 American tax law, however, will assess tax even where
valuation of the consideration is incredibly difficult, 363 unless the value of
what has been received is too inherently speculative. 36 One can assume
361. Is a realization-based system of taxation superior to an accretion-based system?
This Article points out that the solution to this question is not simple because, though
accretion taxation more closely complies with modern economic theory, tax law has differ-
ent objectives. As one economist has stated:
[M]ost economic controversies about definition arise from a failure to keep in
mind the relation of every definition to the purpose for which it is to be used. We
have to be prepared to use different definitions for different purposes; and
although we can often save ourselves trouble by adopting compromises, which
will do well enough for more than one purpose, we must always remember that
compromises have the defects of compromises, and in fine analysis they will need
qualification.
J.R. Hicks, Maintaining Capital Intact: A Further Suggestion (1942), reprinted in READINGS
IN THE CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT OF INCOME, at 145 (R.H. Parker et al. eds., Phillip
Allan Publishers 2d ed. 1986)
As pointed out above, unlike economics, income taxation requires precise conclusions
on timing. Though the arguments in favor of accretion-based taxation are strong, the argu-
ments in favor of realization-based systems are not without considerable merit and have
swayed courts and legislatures. Thus, this analysis does not establish the priority of accre-
tion or realization. Instead, starting with the obvious importance that the concept of reali-
zation has to taxation, this comparative analysis addresses its fundamental nature. The
analysis concludes that the requirement of realization need not prevent economic income
from being taxed to the one who earned it.
362. Clearly a major exception to the doctrine of realization is the treatment of com-
modity traders who are taxed on the basis of current market value. This is known as the
marked to market method. See I.R.C. § 1256 (1994). In these cases, there is an established
market to value these rights. Also, in requiring such taxation, Congress provided that a
portion of the gain (no matter how long the property was held) would be long term capital
gain subject to the special maximum tax rate.
363. See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct.
Cl. 1954) (holding that a ten-year extension of a franchise to operate a concession was
equal to the fair market value of a bridge for tax purposes where the properties had been
exchanged in an arm's-length transaction).
364. See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 414 (1931) (holding that the right to receive
payments based on future output of iron ore from an iron mine, received in exchange for
stock in the mine company, is not capable of valuation, and therefore, should be free from
income tax until the taxpayer has recovered her capital investment).
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that in most cases parties who bargain have a good sense of value.3 65 This
may be equally true with people who give away their property, or who
convert it to personal use.
The American system's narrower view of realization theory leads to
some strange results. The tax benefit doctrine set forth in Hillsboro
clearly contemplates tax consequences where realization is not thought to
exist. This is also true with respect to the Service's position on gifts to
individuals and charities. Thus, while realization does not occur under
American law, the making of a gift can be a taxable event under the tax
benefit doctrine. Indeed, proper application of this doctrine requires the
determination of the fair market value of the property involved. While
this step is necessary to recoup a deduction that was proper when previ-
ously taken, it accomplishes only half as much as the British theory of
realization.
American tax accounting theory that is based on clear reflection of in-
come doctrine requires adjustments when the taxpayer uses different ac-
counting methods and then transfers property between his different
activities. In that case the taxable event is, in essence, a notional sale for
value, similar to the treatment of related taxpayers under transfer pricing
requirements. This treatment is based on general tax principles, and not
on the power afforded the Service under § 482, though, as we have seen,
§ 482 may independently apply as well to these dealings.366 Also, where
the necessity for segregating international intra-business transfers exists
for sourcing purposes, the rules of realization are partially suspended
under American law.
Realization, under British law, is more in accordance with the overall
demands of income taxation. Henry Simons said that income tax is a
personal tax, a tax on income earned by a person and taxed to that per-
son.3 67 Ironically, it was the American system that inspired Simons's
thoughts on personal taxation. The British tax system, on the other hand,
adopts as its starting point a tax on income from things. Interestingly, the
British tax system, through its conclusions about realization and its use of
365. In reviewing these considerations, one should be mindful of the employee who
receives property from his employer. The employee clearly has income even though there
is uncertainty, measurement may be difficult, and the employee may lack the cash to pay
the tax due. A clear distinction in fact between these situations is that the property has
been received pursuant to a market transaction, services have been exchanged for prop-
erty, services have been "sold" for value and, hence, their value has been realized. Also,
since this transaction was a commercial transaction with each party presumably trying to
get good value for what they are giving up, it is fair to conclude that value was important
and was determined.
366. See I.R.C. § 482.
367. SIMONS, supra note 14, at 47-51.
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the concept of notional sales, ensures that, in most cases, the taxpayer
actually pays the tax on the economic income generated from his busi-
nesses and his property. The American concept allows considerable eco-
nomic income to escape taxation.
British law shows that the sine qua non of realization is not a market
transaction. Instead, it teaches that realization is produced by a change in
position with respect to property; we look for a dramatic event that tells
us it is appropriate or necessary to tax inchoate income. Normally, that
economic income is crystallized by a sale. It is made real or confirmed by
a market transaction. Necessity, however, dictates that non-market trans-
actions368 trigger income. Any disposition or termination of an invest-
ment, or use of an asset by a taxpayer that presents the real possibility
that economic income may escape taxation to that taxpayer, or would
fundamentally change the character or other significant tax attributes of
that income, should result in a full taxable event. 369 To quote Lord Rad-
cliffe, this occurs when the tax law requires that "part of a taxpayer's
activities should be isolated and treated as a self-contained [unit]. ' '37°
This approach would preserve the general understanding of realization
as it applies to property. Fluctuations in value of typical capital assets
would still remain untaxed as long as the taxpayer did not terminate his
investment by transfer to or from a profit-making activity. Classic reali-
zation results in deferral of economic gain, not escape. Any disposition
not by way of trade or investment would result in a notional sale for
value.
This approach also preserves the purpose behind the doctrine of reali-
zation. The doctrine of realization survives because it addresses situa-
tions in which valuation may be difficult, gain may be transitory due to
market fluctuations, and taxpayers may have difficulty paying tax unless
the asset is sold. These factors, however, lack weight in the situations we
are considering. When taxpayers voluntarily appropriate property to per-
sonal use, they have received and realized the value at that moment in
time, in every bit as meaningful a way as those situations where property
is transferred from employer to employee. In most cases, there is an es-
368. The term "transactions" is construed in its broadest sense to include internal and
external transactions. See HENRIKSON, supra note 181, at 142. Accounting theory also
recognizes that internal transactions arise from the use or conversion of assets within the
firm. See id
369. Not only would this doctrine include actual transfers like gifts and bequests, but it
could also include deemed realizations like emigration. See INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUD.
IES, supra note 166, at 130.
370. Sharkey v. Wernher, 1956 App. Cas. 58, 84 (appeal taken from C.A.).
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tablished market for the property. Other taxpayers who desire such
property must pay for it at market price.
It must be noted, however, that differences exist between theory and
political choice. Policy may vary the result. Thus, the gift or devise of
property is an actual transaction disposing of the property, a finalization
of the taxpayer's investment, and a realization by the taxpayer of the
value of the property through the appropriation by gift. Certainly,
United States tax law recognizes this phenomena in the case of a charita-
ble contribution by allowing a deduction of the fair market value of the
contribution. Gifts in the United States are considered, for the most part,
as nontaxable events with the recipient receiving the donor's cost or ba-
sis.37' Gifts in the United Kingdom are generally treated under the capi-
tal gains provisions as dispositions at market value for purposes of the
donor and donee.372 British law, however, does provide non-recognition
treatment for a gift of shares or securities in a business.373 Also, gifts
between spouses in the United Kingdom are treated as sales for a price
that produces neither gain nor loss,374 thus affording treatment that is
identical with United States law.375 On the other hand, under British law,
dispositions at death, though defined as sales for value, produce no recog-
nized gain or loss to the decedent.376 The tax outcome is again identical
to the outcome under American law. 377 Also, the requirement of a no-
tional sale for value may be suspended in the case of certain gifts to chari-
ties.378 Though, as can be seen, United Kingdom law has reached some
of the same conclusions as its United States counterpart, these results
371. Since gifts are not taxable events, they present the possibility that potential losses,
incurred by the donor, could be transferred and "realized" by the donee. American law
prevents this result with a rule similar to that utilized for conversions from personal to
business use. The donor's basis (or cost) received by the donee is limited to the fair market
value of the property at the time of the gift, for purposes of depreciation and loss deduc-
tions. See I.R.C. § 1015.
372. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act, 1992, ch. 12, § 17 (Eng.).
373. See id. § 165.
374. See id. § 58.
375. Compare id. with I.R.C. § 1041.
376. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act § 62.
377. Compare id. with I.R.C. §§ 102, 1014.
378. In general, legislation provides two exceptions to the doctrine that donations of
property to charities are notional sales for value. The 1992 Taxation of Chargeable Gains
Act provides at section 257, that, in general, gifts to charities shall be treated as sales for all
purposes that would not produce gain or loss. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act
§ 257. The 1988 Income and Corporation Taxes Act provides relief in section 84 for the
donation of business property to an educational institution. The disposition is not treated
as a notional sale for value, and no adjustment need be made in an inventory account for
the cost of donated goods, nor a balancing adjustment for prior capital allowances. Income
and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 84 (Eng.), amended by Finance Act, 1991, ch. 31,
§ 68 (Eng.).
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were founded upon individual policy decisions, and not upon any per-
ceived limitation of the definition of income imposed by the concept of
realization.
Likewise, the conversion of property from business to personal use,
and from personal to business use, is a fundamental change in the tax-
payer's position in relation to that property. This change eliminates the
reasons for delay in taxation that sustain the doctrine of realization. The
system ignores fluctuations in the market value of property because it
expects that the gain or loss will eventually be fixed by a market transac-
tion, or abandoned in the course of business or personal activity. If that
happens, gain or loss produced by the particular activity will be deter-
mined and treated in the appropriate manner under the system. Instead,
upon conversion, the taxpayer's voluntary acts can prevent those events
from occurring. The recognition that gains and losses have been realized,
subject to exclusions based on conscious policy decisions, would enhance
the integrity of the American system, promote fairness to taxpayers, and
eliminate complex stop-gap measures.
III. CONCLUSION
Reflecting on the methodology of this work, this comparative study be-
gan with a description of the structure of the general systems of United
States and United Kingdom tax law, reviewing how they were created
and the context in which they developed. This study did not end, how-
ever, with a mere description. It included a study of the law as a mecha-
nism to solve problems or conflicts among people and institutions. Thus,
this comparative study has examined theory, structure, and the real world
problems with which the law deals.
The purpose of such an analysis is to utilize the tools of normal legal
analysis in comparative analysis. The comparative analysis is superior be-
cause the setting removes one from reliance on the dogma of one's own
system. There is considerable truth in the statement that comparative
law's "study renews and refreshes the study of national law, which suffers
from confining itself to the interpretation of positive rules and neglecting
broad principles in favour of tiny points of doctrine." '379 This work may
have, at times, descended into the contemplation of "tiny points of doc-
trine." Such an approach, however, gives content to, and is necessary in
understanding, general principles.
Because the United Kingdom and the United States began with sub-
stantial differences in structure, legislative methodology, and even the
379. ZWEIGERT & KoTz, supra note 1, at 4.
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definitions of income, comparison might have been difficult, if not impos-
sible. It has, however, proved productive because there is much more
that is similar about income tax law than is different. Such systems share
a common language and a common intellectual debate as to the meaning
and extent of income taxation. These systems also share a common ob-
jective, to efficiently collect revenue for governments. Income taxation
also is generally recognized by governments as a successful tool with
which to manipulate conduct. Consequently, income taxation has been
advanced furthest by developed economies facing similar economic phe-
nomena. During the time of the most critical development of income tax
systems, when they moved away from being just another tax, and towards
becoming the most significant generator of revenue in developed coun-
tries, there has been considerable interaction between the developed
nations.
Thus, in learning about law from a comparison of income tax systems,
the conclusion of this Article may well be that the greater the contrast,
the greater the level of understanding that can be achieved. In that cruci-
ble of comparison, superior foreign solutions may be suggested. In many
cases, due to fundamental similarities of income tax systems, these for-
eign solutions should not be out of step with the conceptual framework of
the domestic system, and thus, can be transplanted.
The greatest contrast between the systems identified herein is the struc-
tural one. It would be tempting to conclude at this point that one system
is demonstrably superior to the other. This Article eschews that result for
a less lofty goal, which is to suggest that the different methodologies may
suggest different political objectives.
Global systems start with the presupposition that all income is alike,
and that it should be taxed in the same manner to achieve equity among
taxpayers. This presupposition is shared by the economic theories out-
lined above. Source-based taxation assumes that income is different de-
pending on its source, and that taxation naturally responds to the
differences. Whether prompted by theory or politics, governments have
at various times acted to favor one type of income over another. One
example has been favoring the taxation of employment income over in-
vestment income. Schedular taxation presents the more practical ap-
proach to distinguishing income.
Income tax is, however, a tax on net income. Economic theory has
largely ignored the practical problems associated with deductions-pre-
cisely the area where tax systems vary the most. Through deductions,
systems often differentiate between different kinds of income. It is also
through the mechanism of deductions that income tax systems tradition-
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ally promote or discourage various activities. In order to be truly effec-
tive, tax subsidies must be targeted and restricted to the activity intended
to be benefitted. To the extent that governments wish to use tax law to
achieve particularized political results, schedular principles are necessary.
Comparative analysis suggests as many questions as it provides an-
swers. The analysis herein can only hope to provoke further inquiry.
